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August 2008 - Posts
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This short analysis from the invaluable Middle East Media Research Institute is well worth a read. It discusses the controversy Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) leader, Asif Zardari set off when, while delivering the keynote address at the 23rd Internationalist Socialist Congress, he described madrassas as propagating Islamist extremism.
Unsurprisingly, Pakistan’s religious leaders condemned him. But reading the report, and these notes from MEMRI’s Urdu-Pashto Blog also indicates that the madrassas have spread from the Northwest Frontier Province into the rest of the country - including the Punjabi heartland. Although Islam is central to Pakistan’s national identity, the traditional practice of Islam was relatively moderate. In fact there have been skirmishes between different factions within the Sunni community (not to mention the bloody Shia-Sunni violence within Pakistan) - particularly in Karachi.
Considering the endemic corruption and misrule in Pakistan, it is surprising that radicalism has not made inroads faster. Consistently, the Islamist parties do not do terribly well in Pakistani elections (when they proved no better then their secular counterparts, the lost power in NWFP.) But as their influence expands they can, not only expand their parties, they can also re-shape the positions of the major parties, the Pakistan People’s Party and the Pakistan Muslim League (PML). Although the PPP is generally perceived as secular and the PML is seen as closer to the Islamists - both turn to Islam when it is convenient.
Zardari is a problematic figure (although, despite reports he is not mentally ill). He often seems to say the right thing, calling for a more moderate approach to India, and criticizing madrassas. He may actually believe these things. It is also possible that, because he cannot match Nawaz Sharif’s popularity on the ground - his wife the late Benazir Bhutto could - that he is appealing the West and particularly the U.S. as a balance. A real Pakistan policy needs to look beyond any given leader and build a deeper relationship.
Read the full post.
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 The NEFA Foundation has obtained two exclusive interviews with Maulvi Omar, the main spokesman for and a Shura Council member of the Pakistani Taliban movement, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). During the first interview, recorded in May 2008, Maulvi Omar emphasized the connection between both the Pakistani and Afghan Taliban movements and Al-Qaida, saying there is no difference between them, and that they are merely different words for the same ideology, working towards precisely the same goals. Similarly, he accuses former Pakistani President General Pervaiz Musharraf together with the U.S. and its international allies of having "crusader" and "infidel" designs against the entire Muslim world and, as such, are to be considered irreconcilable enemies of Islam.
During the second interview, obtained by NEFA in August 2008, Maulvi Omar declared the TTP to be in total control of Pakistan's tribal areas. Maulvi Omar further claimed that all other local mujahideen militias--including foreign Uzbek militants and tribal fighters—have all been either incorporated into the TTP, or expelled from the tribal areas. He denies reports that al-Zawahiri was wounded, or even ever at the location, of the recent U.S. airstrikes in Damadola. Omar even suggests a link between the TTP and several terrorist attacks in Western countries—including the July 7, 2005 suicide bombings in London, which he claimed were planned from Bajaur.
Both interviews are available on the NEFA Foundation website.
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Phillip Smyth is the the CT Blog's Assistant Newslinks Editor and a contributor to the Aramaic Democratic Organization. He has visited Lebanon, interviewied anti-Hezbollah NGOs and Hezbollah supporters, and maintains regular contact with sources there. He wrote the following about the recent downing of a Lebanese Army helicopter by Hizballah forces.
The hills of Iqlim al-Tuffah are known for their apple orchards, in addition to being an off-limits Hizballah base. The area had been targeted by the Israelis for surgical and reprisal attacks against Hizballah since Israel and the SLA patrolled the Security Zone. The peaceful noon time on Thursday was interrupted by anti-aircraft fire. A helicopter was forced to land in the village of Sojod. Only, this time, the helicopter was not Israeli, nor did it belong to the UNIFIL forces based in southern Lebanon, this was a Lebanese army UH-1 Iroquois (commonly known as the Huey). The helicopter attack also killed one, First Lieutenant Samer Hanna, in addition to other casualties. Nevertheless, the full story of this incident is marred with speculation, rumors and many unnerving facts.
Many in the media insinuated that the attack may have something to do with “Sunni Islamist militants from the north [read: Tripoli]”. The New York Times stated, “The Lebanese Army has come under attack several times this summer, including in a bombing this month that left nine soldiers and several civilians dead.” As with the NYT, the AFP, made sure the Sunni Islamists would be placed at the end of the article stating, "Nine Lebanese soldiers and five civilians were killed in a bombing at a bus stop in the northern port city of Tripoli earlier this month in an attack thought to have targeted the army. The army has also suffered other attacks since it fought a 15-week battle with militants of the Al-Qaeda inspired Fatah al-Islam in the Nahr el-Bared Palestinian refugee camp in northern Lebanon. In December the head of the army's military operations, General Francois el-Hajj, was killed in a massive bomb attack and just over a month later Major Wissam Eid, a top intelligence officer, was killed in similar circumstances.”
In fact, the last attack in the south by suspected Sunni Islamists was in June, 2007, killing 6 Spanish peacekeepers in a UNIFIL convoy. While Hizballah was the obvious cause of the latest attack, and even Hizballah militiamen said that they, “thought that there was an Israeli landing attempt (under way) and opened fire in the direction of the helicopter, hitting it.” The major press still insinuated that a group like Fatah al Islam could be behind the attack. When the attack was first reported, Hizballah initially denied it had anything to do with the attack, but this would later be disproved.
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The U.S.-Libya terrorism settlement which sailed through the U.S. Congress at the end of July and was signed on August 14 has mixed results for both countries and the victims of Libyan-sponsored terrorism. The deal will enable the U.S. and Libya to complete the process of mutual diplomatic recognition and establish economic relationships benefitting both countries and major American industries. The Libyan Victims Compensation Act and a supplemental letter provided by the State Department to some parties call for voluntary contributions of over $1 billion to a U.S. government-administered entity, which would then compensate the American victims. The fund would also compensate Libyan representatives of those injured or killed by the 1986 U.S. airstrike ordered by Presdient Reagan after the LaBelle discotheque bombing in Germany, in which Americans and Europeans were killed. It also presents a host of unknown consequences for the victims of the remaining current members of the "state sponsors of terrorism" list: Cuba, Iran, Sudan, Syria, and North Korea. To my knowledge, it is the first law which mandates a claims settlement process for victims of a former "state sponsor," which makes it a template for the resolution of all claims against a former "state sponsor" upon normalization of relations.
Those representatives of American victims Libyan terrorist attacks who had not settled will receive substantial monetary compensation, but the settlement was not universally hailed. Some American citizens whose loved ones were killed by Libyan-sponsored terrorism were not consulted about the Act until it was about to pass Congress. Apparently one such group included American plaintiffs whose loved ones on UTA Flight 772 were murdered by a Libyan suitcase bomb in September 1989. The 51 American plaintiffs in that case were awarded $6 billion months months ago by a federal judge; they issued a statement (through their attorneys) critical of the Act.
The Act seeks to exclude foreign plaintiffs whose loved ones were killed with Americans in the same attack from participating in the settlement fund. In my paying job, I represent one of the law firms with clients in a case arising from Libyan-armed IRA terrorists. (This post presents only my views and does not necessarily reflect those of my client.) Europeans who are joined with Americans in this suit, with their claim of jurisdiction based in the Alien Tort Statute of 1789 ("ATS"), went to bed as plaintiffs and awoke as possible legal non-entities as Congress passed the Act on the evening of July 31. In his press briefing on the settlement which he negotiated for the U.S., Assistant Secretary Welch briefly stated, "Under American law, you know, only Americans can bring these kinds of suits in the United States," reflecting an apparent State Department policy of actively excluding foreign terrorism victims from U.S. courts. But for two centuries, since the enactment of the ATS, the U.S. has recognized the ability of foreign citizens to bring tort lawsuits in the United States for acts which violate customary international law or U.S. treaties; those acts would naturally include terrorist attacks. Assistant Secretary Welch’s statement undermines years of jurisprudence and victims’ attempts to hold terrorists accountable for their actions. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004), on the ATS in general, and see the discussion of the ATS beginning on page 20 of the order by U.S. District Court Judge Nina Gershon denying the Arab Bank's motion to dismiss, issued January 29, 2007.
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Last week, Jordan's minister of information publicly confirmed that senior Jordanian officials have been meeting with Hamas in an effort to "solve pending security issues." These talks represent a significant shift for Amman, since relations between Jordan and the Palestinian group had been frozen for two years, following the arrest of three Hamas members in the kingdom on terrorism and weapons charges.
As my colleague David Schenker and I argue in this co-authored piece, while the decision to renew contacts with Hamas suggests that Amman remains concerned with Hamas-related activities in the kingdom, the timing also highlights domestic and regional pressures on King Abdullah and the Jordanian government.
Our full analysis is available here.
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The NEFA Foundation has published several new items on its website which will be of interest to counterterrorism researchers. First, the NEFA Foundation has obtained video of a conversation with Taliban Deputy Commander Sirajuddin Haqqani, the son of the infamous Afghan mujahideen leader Jalaluddin Haqqani. Though only in his early thirties, Haqqani is considered one of the most powerful Taliban military commanders in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and has been rumored as a possible internal political rival to the current Taliban administration of Mullah Mohammed Omar. Haqqani has freely acknowledged his role in organizing recent terrorist attacks in the Afghan capital Kabul, and his partnership with foreign fighters arriving from elsewhere in the Muslim world. This video was made by Rahimullah Yousufzai, a veteran reporter/analyst based in Peshawar.
Second, the NEFA Foundation has released a transcript of the latest audio message from Al-Qaida’s Deputy Commander Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri. Addressing his plea to the Pakistani military, al-Zawahiri spoke for the first time in English and called upon low and mid-ranking soldiers to violently revolt against the leadership of Pervaiz Musharraf and his alliance with the United States. Al-Zawahiri also discussed at length his own experiences and knowledge of Pakistan, though he also conceded that his unfamiliarity with Urdu was forcing him to adopt English, the language of the “enemies of Islam.”
Third, the NEFA Foundation has obtained the responses provided by 9/11 planners Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM) and "Khallad" to questions submitted by Salim Hamdan's attorneys. Asked whether Hamdan had "any involvement in the planning of attacks outside Afghanistan," KSM stated, "he was not at all a military man." He added, "as a member in Al-Qaeda Council (Shoura) the highest executive committee in Al-Qaeda, I am certain of all who works in the field mentioned..." He later said, "I personally was the executive director of 9/11, and Hamdan had no previous knowledge of the operation, or any other one." Asked about information flow in Al-Qaida, KSM responded, "so many of UBL's inner circles have no knowledge of what he was planning and so many of Al-Qaeda members and even the trainers at the military camps do not have any knowledge of the works of the outside cells. That includes the civilian employees."
Finally, the NEFA Foundation has released additional content drawn from Al-Somood, a monthly Islamic magazine published by the Taliban’s media center. In this piece, dated July 2007, Al-Somood provides a biography of Taliban military commander Mullah Dadullah, who was killed by NATO and Afghan troops in May 2007. The biography explains that "“One of the most dangerous (things) the martyr Dadullah had done against the worldwide crusader ally in Afghanistan is coaching the suicide youngsters who had overpowered the crusader forces as soldiers. The number of these youngsters reaches the hundreds and they have been spread in the different counties of Afghanistan. These youngsters have succeeded, with the kindness of the raised God, in filling the hearts of the enemy with fear from everything and in every place, and for that, the enemy saw him (Dadullah) as the master of the suicides and named him as the martyr Zarqawi, the master of the suicides in Iraq.”
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I have an article in the latest issue of The Sentinel, the West Point Combating Terrorism Center’s journal. The piece is entitled A Preliminary Assessment of Counter-Radicalization in the Netherlands and describes various programs implemented by Dutch authorities, focusing particularly on those of the city of Amsterdam. The second part of the article analyzes the relationship between authorities and political Salafists/non-violent Islamists, a topic that has been addressed several times by CT blog contributors and, most recently, in an excellent post by Matt Levitt. This is what I wrote in The Sentinel:
…..Dutch authorities are faced with the same dilemma haunting most of their Western counterparts: can non-violent Islamists be engaged and used as partners against violent radicalization? Can Western offshoots of the Muslim Brotherhood or political Salafists like those active in the Netherlands become partners against the appeal of jihadists? The Dutch seem to address these questions by drawing a clear line between engaging and empowering. All sorts of voices, as long as they do not advocate violence, should be engaged, since pushing non-violent Islamists at the margins could have negative repercussions. Nevertheless, authorities feel they cannot consider them as permanent partners, as there is a clear understanding that these forces espouse a message that clashes with the Dutch government’s ideas of democracy, integration and cohesive society.
This assessment leads to a case-by-case approach in which authorities engage non-violent Islamists when they need to and when common ground can be found. This policy was implemented, for example, during the months preceding the release of the controversial movie Fitna by Dutch MP Geert Wilders. Security services held several meetings with some of the most radical Salafist imams in the country, explaining that the Dutch government did not support Wilders and obtaining from the imams a promise, later kept, that they would have urged their followers not to react violently to the movie. Nevertheless, the security services do not consider political Salafists as reliable partners and advise local authorities from doing so. The security services’ advice is particularly important since political Salafists have been regularly approaching municipalities and provinces with offers of partnership in counter-radicalization and integration programs….
As Matt correctly stated, the reality on the ground is what dictates the policies and attitudes of authorities. Given the situation in most European countries, some form of cooperation with political Salafists/non-violent Islamists is necessary (even though that does not necessarily mean that that is the right policy in other places). What is important is to understand the real aims of our interlocutors and to keep clear in mind the difference between engaging and empowering. The Dutch seem to get both concepts.
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From the press releases of the coalition forces, we can see that there's never a dull moment in Iraq:
1. Coalition forces in Diyala killed three terrorists, two of whom were wearing suicide vests, and detained an alleged al-Qaeda in Iraq leader. The AQI suspect is allegedly responsible for bombing attacks and assassinations.
2. Soldiers found 100 blasting caps, 20 rocket-propelled grenades, two 120 mm mortar rounds, a 60 mm mortar round, two anti-tank rounds and 35 parachute grenades in a Baghdad neighborhood.
3. In the best news of the day, we captured an important Iranian-linked terrorist leader responsible for killing Americans as well as Iraqis: "Coalition forces captured a suspected senior Special Groups leader Wednesday morning during an operation at Baghdad International Airport. Intelligence sources report that the captured man is part of the most senior social and operational circles of Special Groups. Most notably, he is believed to be responsible for the planning of the June 24, 2008 bombing of the Sadr City District Advisory Council meeting, where six Iraqis, two U.S. State Department employees and two U.S. service members were killed. Ten other Iraqis were wounded in the blast. The man has been known to travel in and out of Iraq to neighboring nations including Iran and Lebanon, where it is believed he meets and helps run the Iranian-backed Special Groups in Iraq."
Anybody have an idea on this guy's identity? Note his travels to Iran and Lebanon - sounds like someone with a Hezbollah passport.
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The Los Angeles Times today carries an interesting story on the growing ties of Hezbollah in Venezuela.
As the article points out, such ties are not new, but what is more worrisome is the vast amount of cocaine being moved through Venezuela that passes through areas where the Hezbollah presence is most pronounced.
The issue is, of course, Iran's growing presence in the region, something the administration has paid surprising little attention to as the Iranian diplomatic and intelligence presence has mushroomed, not only in Venezuela, but in Bolivia, Ecuador and Nicaragua.
Even Colombia, one of the few countries that is a strong U.S. ally in the region, has felt the need to allow the Iranians to open an embassy in Bogotá, in large part to have some idea of what that country is up to in the region.
It is passing strange that a socialist revolutionary (Hugo Chavez) and a radical Shite leader (Mahmoud Ahmadinejad) have become such fast strategic allies.
It is more strange that Iran is investing billions of dollars and expanding its diplomatic presence throughout Latin America, a region where it has almost no economic ties, no national interest and no historic presence.
This growth, not just in Iranian presence but in the availability of the diplomatic infrastructure to give immunity to activities of Hezbollah and Iran's Revolutionary Guard, will be a destabilizing factor in the region for years to come. My full blog is here.
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There is a fascinating interview with Mohammed Habib, the deputy supreme leader of the Muslim Brotherhood where he acknowledges that the Brotherhood has a presence inside the United States.
As I have repeatedly stated, there is nothing illegal about the Muslim Brotherhood being here. What makes the groups that grew out of the _Ikhwan_ so interesting and perplexing is their unwillingness to admit that relationship, despite the fact there is no sanction against belonging to the organization. Why act as a covert front group when you could legally exist?
Habib also defends Sudanese president Omar Bashir against the international arrest warrant issued for him, and has various other statements of interest, particularly naming Hamas (again) as a branch of the MB.
But let's start at the beginning, the ties to U.S. organizations that those organizations have vigorously denied. It is not that this was not known. See this report for the NEFA Foundation I co-authored for a more complete picture of what the evidence is.
The Daily Global Muslim Brotherhood Daily Report (free subscription required) also has an archive of information on the subject.
Here is the extended key passage of the interview on this issue, so nothing is taken out of context. Read carefully, it gives an interesting and disturbing view of the MB agenda in the United States, one much more accurate than it's legacy groups present: My full blog is here.
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Officials at the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) offer swift and vehement denials when anyone publicly links them to the Muslim Brotherhood, an international movement that seeks the spread of Shariah, or Islamic law, throughout the world.
This week, someone has made that connection again. And CAIR's reaction will be interesting to watch. The source this time? Mohammed Habib, the second-in-command of the Muslim Brotherhood. In an interview published by Pajamas Media, the Brotherood's Deputy Supreme Guide acknowledges the connection between his organization and CAIR.
Habib spoke candidly about the Brotherhood's relationship with affiliates - or, "Muslim Brotherhood entities," as he termed them - outside of Egypt.
For the full story, please visit the IPT's website.
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There is a common misperception that terrorism can be carried out on the cheap and that small terrorist cells simply raise their funds locally making it extremely difficult to detect. This seems to be the thesis of a number of recent articles, including one a few days ago in the Washington Post. They maintain that terrorist groups simply avoid bank transactions, making current financial controls inutile. Nothing could be further from the truth! Terrorism financing is still big business, and the sophisticated money laundering and counter-terrorism financing oversight and regulatory mechanisms we have in place remain essential tools in combating terrorism. In fact, they are among our most useful tools in identifying the sources of terrorist funding and holding them accountable, and for tracking down the terrorist cells themselves. We need to intensify these measures and have them replicated in Europe and internationally in order to place similar restraints on terrorist funding sources overseas.
Terrorist attacks certainly have not abated since 9/11; neither has the flow of funds that support well organized terrorist organizations. While the cost of funding certain terrorist attacks might appear quite small, the fact is that indoctrinating, recruiting, motivating, training and equipping the terrorists that carry out such attacks is very expensive. Keeping Bin Laden, Zawahiri and their al Qaeda cohorts armed, fed, well protected, and hidden somewhere in Pakistan’s Northwest Frontier region is not an inexpensive operation; nor has the resurgence of the Taliban and its reorganization and re-armament come without great expense. Al Qaeda’s continuing operations in Iraq and its further extension into Somalia, Sudan and other areas of Africa also requires substantial funding. To this must be added the money it takes to support the military and terrorist wings of Hamas, Hezbollah, Islamic Jihad, and so many other terrorist groups operating in areas of Palestine, Lebanon, Egypt, and other areas of the Middle East. In fact, with terrorist cells operating as well in South and Southeast Asia, the former Soviet Union, Europe, and in North and South America, terrorism financing now involves a global reach. These worldwide operations are not financed alone through small local business operations, petty crime, or internet schemes. Rather, they rely on deep pocket donors and on complex funding schemes, including the illicit drug trade, and substantial fund raising, transfer and distribution mechanisms.
At the same time, there are a number of small local groups, often made up of disaffected youth and others ready to carry out their own version of terrorism. These small local terrorist cells, it is true, operate on limited funding, which is usually self generated. Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups have effectively tapped into this phenomenon and increasingly use such groups, particularly in Europe, as their surrogates. They do so by using the internet as an indoctrinating and recruiting tool, and by infiltrating local community centers and mosques so as to identify and recruit potential future terrorists and suicide bombers. Some of those so identified have had their passage paid to one of several Al Qaeda training camps in Pakistan, Afghanistan, the Middle East and elsewhere. Al Qaeda views these groups as highly expendable and apart from priming them for terrorism, expends little additional effort to fund or direct them. Fortunately, most such groups have been vulnerable to detection through established police intelligence gathering methods, and relative few have so far escaped detection. Nevertheless, such groups remain dangerous threats to domestic security.
While we have been doing a plausible job here at home, in regulating, overseeing and tracing suspicious terrorism-related transactions, and Europe is catching up, much of the world remains a sieve for major terrorism financing. There is still no international consensus on which groups, apart from Al Qaeda and the Taliban, are to be considered terrorist organizations and have their funding ties cut. And even with Al Qaeda and the Taliban, few countries still have the necessary means and political commitment to adequately regulate terrorism fundraising, transfer and distribution activities. This is particularly the case in Saudi Arabia, Iran, and several other Gulf States which openly support Hamas, Hezbollah, and other groups, and devote few, if any, resources to regulate and oversee the financial operations of their established banks and charities. This places a significantly increased burden on the US and European intelligence community to effective monitor the critical nodes of international transactions, and to otherwise seek to compensate for this serious international lacunae in controlling terrorism financing.
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Last Friday night, the main server at the company which hosts our operations suffered a massive crash (no cyberattack indicated), which left us unable to post new material. Posts as of mid-July have been restored, with more to be uploaded, and we will post fresh Newslinks. As a service to our readers, I am making available Microsoft Word files with all July posts and all August posts up to the time of the crash.
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The Guardian Online just posted an assessment I co-wrote with my friend Jim Hendler (computer science professor at RPI) about the Georgia-Russia cyberwar.
The first modern cyberwar?
Aaron Mannes and James Hendler
Friday August 22 2008
The Russian-Georgian conflict is being described as the first time cyber-attacks have accompanied an actual war. Last year, the Russian-Estonian spat was described as the first modern cyber-war. These descriptions over dramatise events and are a distraction from the more prosaic, but more serious, danger these illicit cyber-actions represent. The technology used in these cyber-conflicts has only limited strategic impact, but represents a major threat to one of the most successful engines of human freedom and opportunity - the World Wide Web itself.
The strikes against Georgian government websites, along with last April's attacks against Estonian websites, were distributed denial of service attacks (DDoS) where many computers simultaneously send messages to a website, preventing legitimate traffic from reaching the site. These attacks are relatively easy to launch, but taking a website down does not affect real world infrastructure and competent IT professionals can counter or at least mitigate DDoS attacks. The increasing volume and sophistication of these attacks is a subject much discussed among IT professionals, but its impact is to create an inconvenience.
Read the complete article here.
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The following short piece is a summary of an analysis I discussed during this summer June-July with European officials as a Visiting Fellow with the European Foundation for Democracy in Brussels. Among the main groups and fora I presented these ideas to were: The Majority Party EPP at the European Parliament in its Conference in Paris; the secretariat for international relations of the European Socialist Group; the Center for International Affairs in Rome with the participation of the Chief of Staff of the Italian Armed Forces; members of the Budenstag on National Security and Foreign Affairs in Berlin, counter terrorism officials at the European Union including from the UK, Germany, Spain, Czech Republic, Rumania, Belgium, Slovakia, Poland, Estonia, as well as top officials at the interior ministries offices on radicalization in Germany, France and the UK. I will expand in another posting on the circulation of ideas and the various challenges facing Europe and the West in general per these discussions. The summary below was initially presented at the Paris Conference and shared with the various officials I met with.
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The Guardian newspaper made public today parts of a classified internal research document produced by Britain's MI-5. As someone who has worked in intelligence and law enforcement, I do not condone the unauthorized release of classified material. While it is important to keep the public informed, prematurely releasing classified matieral can put (human) sources and (technical) methods at risk. I wonder how much such considerations factored into the Guardian's decision to publish its "exclusive" report on this report.
The academic analyst in me, however, is intrigued by the findings of this study, which is reportedly based on in-depth case studies of "several hundred individuals known to be involved in, or closely associated with, violent extremist activity." Combined with previous reports that as many as 4,000 Islamic extremists trained in Afgan training camps before returning to Britain, and British security officials' estimates that as many as 2,000 persons may be plotting attacks within the country, the findings of the classified MI-5 report highlight the incredible scope of the problem of radicalization in the UK.
Terrorist suspects, the study found, are mostly British nationals and the remainder are, with few exceptions, legal immigrants. Still, while some are well-educated and some are not, most are employed in low-grade jobs suggesting a lack of economic mobility and social integration are a big part of the problem in the UK.
Many lack religous literacy and are therefore susceptible to radical interpretations of extremist preachers or internet sites. There is evidence, British analysts suggest, that a well-established religious identity could protect against violent radiclization. In other words, the problem may not be too much but too little religion.
That the UK is engaged in such data collection and analysis is extremely impressive. The study, and its findings, help explalin why it is that the UK, along with Holland and a few other countries, is proactively developing cutting edge counter-radicalization techniques. Here in the U.S., immigrant communities are better integrated and enjoy a sense of economic mobility immigrant communities in Europe often do not. Still, American authorities would do well not only to learn from the studies and programs being implemented in the UK and elsewhere in Europe, but to implement some of their own.
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 The UK's Guardian today published details of a report produced by Britain's Security Service (MI5) entitled, 'Understanding radicalization and violent extremism in the UK'. The report is from MI5's internal behavioral analysis unit and contains within it some interesting and surprising conclusions. The Guardian report covers many of these in depth (so no need to go over here) but one point, which is worth highlighting is the claim made within the report that religion is and was not a contributory factor in the radicalization of the home-grown terrorist threat that the UK faces. In fact, the report goes on to state that a strong religious faith protects individuals from the effects of extremism.
This viewpoint is one that is gathering strength and coincides with an article written by Martin Amis in the Wall Street Journal, which also argues that 'terrorism's new structure' is about the quest for fame
and thirst for power, with religion simply acting as a "means of mobilization".
All of this also tends to agree with the assertion made by Philip Bobbit in 'Terror and Consent', that al-Qaeda is simply version 1.0 of a new type of terrorism for the 21st century. This type of terrorism is attuned to the advantages and pressures of a market based world and acts more like a Silicon Valley start-up company than the Red Brigades -- being flexible, fast moving and wired -- taking advantage of globalization to pursue a violent agenda.
This all somewhat begs the question of, what next? If al-Qaeda is version 1.0 what is 2.0? This of course is hard to discern but looking at the two certain trends, which will shape humanity over the next 20 years - urbanization and virtualization - throws up some interesting potential opponents who are operating today. The road to mass urbanization is currently being highlighted by the 192021 project (19 cities, 20 million people in the 21st century) and amongst other things, points to the large use of slum areas to grow the cities of the 21st century. Slum areas are today being globally exploited from Delhi to Sao Paulo by Nigerian drug organizations that are able to recruit the indigenous people to build their own cities within cities. This kind of highly profitable criminal activity in areas beyond the vision of government is a disturbing incubator.
 Increased global virtualization complements urbanization as well as standing alone. Virtual environments provide a useful platform for any kind of real-life extremist (as is now widely accepted) but it is the formation of groups within virtual spaces that then spill-out into real-space that could become a significant feature of the 21st century security picture. At the moment the 'Anonymous' group that was formed virtually in order to attack the Church of Scientology ( project Chanology) is proving what can be achieved in this area. Some of the loosely associated groups surrounding this movement are said to have been involved in 'swatting' - which is the misdirection of armed police officers to a victim's home address. A disturbing spill-over into real-space.
Therefore, whatever pattern future terrorist movements follow, there are signs that religion will play a peripheral rather than central role.
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On July 22 and 23, I attended a conference co-hosted by the Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies at the National Defense University and the Inter-University Center for Legal Studies at the International Law Institute, titled, "Lifting the Fog of Law: Legal Regimes to Combat Terrorism in the Near East and South Asia” in Washington. The conference brought together 70 experts from the U.S., North Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia came together to exchange views on the effectiveness of legal regimes in those regions as a foundation upon which to build national and international counter-terrorism efforts. Both hosting organizations are known for their objective analyses of and experience in CT policy, and we have co-sponsored numerous panels with the co-director of the Inter-University Center, Dr. Yonah Alexander (see a summary of our last such panel held in May). With their permission, I am posting a summary of the proceedings' main points:
"Multiple insights into the traditions for dealing with violent actors and the various national legal regimes under discussion resulted from the conference. These insights will be fully addressed in the edited volume that will result from this event. There were, however, some overarching issues that bear mentioning here.
a. Context Matters: In the international arena, law and legal frameworks are to a great extent the product of the cultural environment from which they originate; and they have evolved on different tracks over time in response to individual situations. It is a difficult task to reconcile differences in legal systems with such divergent origins and underlying rationales, even where interests are shared and common threats menace.
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In facing new threats, a fundamental focus must be on defining the identity of such threats and an associated awareness of the need to change our governmental and policy strategies accordingly. If the threats are not clearly identified and defined, the consequences are a series of desperate, fractured tactical efforts to address aspects of the threats as perceived by diverse governmental organizations, without a coordinated strategy. Such a tactical-centric approach to new threats would predictably draw upon old paradigms and processes used in addressing older, previous threats.
This remains the primary challenge to America in dealing with Jihad. Without defining Jihad's ideological basis, desperate governmental leaders and policy analysts revert to using outdated tactical measures that are focused on regional threats and Cold War statist measures. Without a strategy defining the ideological threat, government and policy leaders are confused, misguided, and frightened, and offer half-measure tactics. In today's America, this combination of factors has resulted in the current ambiguous "war on extremism."
To effectively deal with the war of ideas that Jihad represents, American government and policy leaders must honestly and clearly define the enemy ideology, and reject regional and statist tactics that are designed for a different enemy than we are fighting today.
The Regional Conflict Perspective to Jihad
On August 18, 2008 in the southern Philippines, new Jihadist atrocities were committed against the Philippine people, leaving 39 dead. News reports stated that " ome of the civilians were hacked to death by machetes and there were reports that some were used as human shields during the violent rampage." This is the latest in a Jihadist struggle that has reportedly claimed 120,000 lives in the past 30 years in the southern Philippines - equivalent to forty 9/11 attacks. Yet this Jihadist atrocity does not get major mainstream news coverage, because of a counterterror position that is prevalent throughout much of America's intelligence agencies and analysts, which views Jihad in the Philippines as an isolated, regional conflict that has no links to Jihadist terrorism elsewhere in the world.
Analysts have remained focused on the geographical and ethnic issues in the Philippine Jihad struggle on the southern most Philippine island of Mindanao, which is 63 percent Christian, but where Islamic supremacists seek to have a segregated, separate territory. In fact, to try to achieve peace by accommodating segregationist goals of such separatists, the Philippine government created an Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) which has its own separate government (that the other Philippine citizens have to support 98 percent of its economy). The latest violence is the result of a Philippine Supreme Court decision that defies the Islamic ARMM territory from having the "right" to assimilate new cities and provinces to expand its separatist territory. The Philippine's Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) jihad attacks have been defended by terrorist leader Abdurahman Macapaar who threatens total war on the Philippine citizens and states that "in the eyes of Allah we are not terrorists," calling for "Islamic justice in Mindanao." The horror of the Jihadist atrocities in the Philippines is lost on the U.S. Ambassador to Philippines Kristie Kenney who urges the Philippine government to negotiate with this same MILF organization, and dismisses the latest attacks as merely "a few bad days."
The "regional conflict" perspective is so embedded among many policy analysts that there is no linkage between the Islamic supremacist ideology inspiring the Philippines Jihad resulting in 120,000 dead, the ongoing terror attacks (Jihad and Communist) in India with an estimated 60,000+ dead (TOI report, BJP report), the ongoing Jihad attacks in Thailand since 2004 with 2,700 dead, the thousands dead from Jihad in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the steady stream of Jihadist terror plots and Islamic supremacist abuses in the United Kingdom and Europe. The standard argument remains that a solution to this global threat must analyze the needs of the local communities in each area to find ways to discourage "extremism." Moreover, since the victims are not in Iraq, they get minimal to no American mainstream media news coverage, except for wire news reports. Jihadist terror that has resulted in hundreds of thousands dead in other regions of the world is just not "news" to many American media outlets.
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The SITE Intelligence Group has issued a press release that a new speech is forthcoming from Al Qaeda's #2, Ayman al-Zawahiri, containing eulogies for two recently killed Al Qaeda commanders, Abu Khabab al-Masri (a.k.a. Midhat Mursi al-Sayid Umar) and Abu Abdullah al-Shami, an escapee from Bagram prison in July 2005 and killed last month in a U.S. strike. I posted about al-Masri's reported death on July 28, and Evan Kohlmann posted the NEFA Foundation's transcript of Al Qaeda's acknowledgement of that on August 6.
The value of this message is that it is final confirmation that the head of al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, Mustafa Abu al-Yazid, was not killed in a Pakistani strike as reported on August 12, as deduced by his signature on this message and his exclusion from the names of the eulogized. The American intel community never supported that report, as I noted in the update to my post.
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The increasingly sophisticated attacks by the Taliban against U.S. and NATO troops, including the recent coordinated strikes that left 10 French soldiers dead shows how the Taliban has evolved over the past year.
What is clear is that, whatever the strategy there is, it is not working. I would argue that the almost exponential growth rate of opium cultivation in recent years is the vital component in allowing the Taliban to obtain the resources to replenish its fighting capabilities, which were almost destroyed in the wake of 9/11.
This source of income to the Taliban is free from any controls a state sponsor would be able to impose on the use of donated funds. The commodity can be easily exchanged for weapons, or turned into cash to pay for new recruits, training, protection and logistics. A consequence, in addition to the sophisticated frontal attacks, is the rapid growth of increasingly sophisticated road side bombs, now causing the most casualties of any weapon in Afghanistan.
Given that the cash pipeline is not being attacked in any way that is making a significant difference, the plans for a mini surge there, with additional U.S. troops is unlikely to make a key difference.
As US News reported, Some U.S. military officials express skepticism, however, about the impact more U.S. troops can make seven years into the war, in a large country that has grown increasingly violent—with citizens, they add, who are increasingly disillusioned. "I don't know if it's too late," says a senior military official. "But it's going to be much, much harder to turn things around at this point."
In fact, what is alarming in the discussions of the surge in Afghanistan is the almost-total lack of focus on opium revenues as a key component.
If one looks at two recent cases where there has been measurable and important successes against non-state armed groups (Al Qaeda in Iraq and the FARC in Colombia), one of the key components is the shutting off of financial revenues. My full blog is here.
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"But implementation to be decided later"
Amidst a growing world crisis, new developments in Lebanon may signal what lies ahead in the sphere of global jihadist forces in the near future. A memorandum of understanding has been signed by Hezbollah, the main pro-Iranian organization in the region, and a number of Salafist groups outlining efforts to "confront America."
Innocent minds may question how that impacts our lives. However, events that unfold in Beirut have a direct effect on the war on terror, or to be more precise, on the jihadist war on democracies. Here is why:
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Jeffrey Imm’s recent broadside against myself, my colleague Michael Jacobson, The Washington Institute’s Stein Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, West Point’s Counterterrorism Center, and the Quilliam Foundation is a poor reflection of the Counterterrorism Blog in its departure from the Blog’s tradition of civil and scholarly debate. Unfortunately, Imm’s blog is neither.
Contrary to Mr. Imm’s assertion that I criticized him in my July 17 post, that article barely mentioned him at all (and never in a derogatory tone) focusing instead on the substance at hand. In concluded, “While Mr. Imm is right that not every extremist or terrorist renouncing their former way of life is fully deradicalized, to dismiss all of them is not only short sighted, but risks missing valuable opportunities for the US and its allies.” Mr. Imm’s most recent post only underlines that conclusion.
But before I address the substantive issues, let me correct just two of Mr. Imm’s multiple factual errors.
In his post, Mr. Imm criticizes my colleague Michael Jacobson for citing Dr. Fadl as someone who has renounced terrorism in a recent article published in West Point CTC's publication "The Sentinel." Mr. Imm says that this is part of a broader pattern with the Washington Institute, accusing us of having a "consistently uncritical view" regarding those who claim to have left terrorism behind.
Mr. Imm's charges on this issue are badly off the mark. First, Mr. Imm has taken Mr. Jacobson's statements out of context to suggest that he has given Dr. Fadl the seal of approval. In his article, Mr. Jacobson was not citing Dr. Fadl's renunciation to indicate that he was persuaded that it was genuine. In fact, Mr. Jacobson was making a far different point -- that despite the positive attention heaped on Dr. Fadl and others who have publicly recanted, we do not know what the effect of these recantations will be on those currently in terrorist organizations. We need to understand this issue far better to design a successful and effective counterterrorism program. To take this very legitimate point and use it to "demonstrate" that the Institute is uncritical is quite disingenuous.
Mr. Imm's ideologically driven analysis is clear from the fact that he so readily dismisses the possible broader implications of Dr. Fadl's statements. Even if Dr. Fadl hasn't fully renounced all terrorism, it would still be very significant that one of the original founders of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, a man on whom Bin Ladin and al Qaeda have relied to provide the ideological foundation for their takfiri ideology, is now recanting some of his former positions. Many analysts believe that his statements criticizing al Qaeda - along with those of other former clerics and terrorist leaders - are beginning to cause a real schism within the global jihadist community. How the US can take advantage of a possible fissure through its counterterrorism and counter-radicalization efforts is a critical and immediate question that Mr. Imm is far too quick to dismiss. While there is certainly room for skepticism about the ultimate ramifications, it is critical to at least consider the potential implications of these recent developments.
Mr. Imm took the liberty of quoting me out of context as well. Imm contends that I made “the incredible claim” that the way back from Islamism is through political salafists who have credibility when it comes to deradicalizing others. In fact, I noted that officials in the UK, the Netherlands and elsewhere have successfully leveraged even political salafists in their counter-radicalization efforts, even as they see these groups for what they are and recognize they still support some forms of extremism. Without accepting them, these governments are using them to their advantage. I noted this, concluding that “these are issues which bear further exploring”:
Another important question that needs to be asked, and one that has often been given short- shrift (including on this blog) is how to leverage the ideological fissures that develop between and among our adversaries -- even when the more moderate wing is still not as moderate as we would like them to be. In the UK, for example, a distinction is often made between "jihadi salafists" and "political salafists," with the government willing to work with some groups that fall into the latter category but none in the former. (For the record, Quilliam has come out against working with groups that fall into either category). Not only do the political salafists have credibility when it comes to deradicalizing others, but as the Dutch argue it may be better to keep them in the larger tent than drive them further underground. In addition, having recently spent time in the UK (as well as France and Holland), talking to counterterrorism officials and local community leaders, it is striking how concerned they are about the threat of an imminent attack. Against that background, it becomes more understandable why they're trying to find allies wherever they can. The British realize they may have significant differences with "political salafists" who think "resistance" in Palestine or Iraq is legitimate, but are thinking about ways that they can at least leverage them and their positions in an effort to de-radicalize the most severe extremists (taqfiris) randomly targeting civilians today.
Mr. Imm also ignored in his postings inconvenient truths. For example, Mr. Imm challenged Quilliam to reject Islamic supremacism, and when Mr. Nawaz did exactly that it went unacknowledged by Mr. Imm.
On the issue of substance, Mr. Imm confuses and conflates two separate issues. The question is not whether radical Islamic extremism is a problem, nor whether support for terrorism or political violence is acceptable in some circumstances but not in others - we’re all in agreement that suicide bombing in Israel or Iraq is just as barbaric, criminal and unacceptable as use of that tactic is in the UK or elsewhere. A review of the Institute’s Stein Program’s work on the subject speaks for itself, and is there for the general public and Mr. Imm to review, including our books, peer-reviewed academic articles, policy articles, editorials, and more.
Rather, the issue is how to leverage “political salafists” in our counter-radicalization campaigns when, unlike Quilliam, they are not fully moderate and do still support some forms of “jihad” or terrorism that we do not. We need not accept them to use them to our advantage, a cornerstone of traditional tradecraft.
Mr. Imm is correct to question how it is that analysts should go about assessing claims of moderation by Muslim groups, especially by former radicals. The answer, I submit once more, is that it requires something more than armchair analysis and research-by-Google. Mr. Imm notes that as a second generation British-American he has spent plenty of time in the UK. But time spent visiting cousins is not field research. How much of that time has Mr. Imm spent interviewing former Jihadists? How much of that time was spent in East or North London? How much time did Mr. Imm invest meeting with intelligence, law enforcement, or the Home Office? These types of meetings are key to understanding not only the terrorist threat, but what should be done to counter it. While Mr. Imm’s open source research is thorough, true scholarship must also include reviewing primary sources and conducting on the ground, first-hand field research. Mr. Imm may disagree with us based on articles he’s read online, but Mr. Jacobson and I feel reaching out to groups like Quilliam, and exploring ways to leverage fissures within the extremist community, are critical aspects of a successful counterterrorism strategy.
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In my July 16, 2008 article "False Reports of Jihadists 'Quitting' or Abandoning Islamic Supremacism," I challenged the Quilliam Foundation to address some key questions that were being asked about its organization. The primary issue I raised was its documented support for Egyptian Grand Mufti Sheik Ali Gomaa (also spelled "Ali Gum'a" or "Goma").
In reply, the Washington Institute for Near East Policy's Stein Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence Director Matthew Levitt criticized me on July 17 for asking this obvious question, and on August 15, that same organization's Michael Jacobson published a "response" to my July 16 article on behalf of Maajid Nawaz of the Quilliam Foundation.
Mr. Nawaz's comments in Mr. Jacobson's reposting "Quilliam Responds" are not a response at all, but are directed towards a July 30, 2008 letter from various senators to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice regarding "a 2003 article in Egypt's 'Al-Haqiqa' newspaper quoting Ali Goma defending terrorist acts in Israel." Mr. Nawaz dismisses this quote as he states it is coming from a "Wahabite-Islamist source" and "a newspaper that explicitly promotes a Shari'ah-law based Caliphate." (On the other hand, Mr. Nawaz does not explain how he defends Ali Gomaa who is interviewed in the March 2008 U.S. News and World Report as seeing Sharia as a solution for "Islamic extremism.")
Mr. Nawaz further defends Gomaa by referencing a July 21, 2007 Newsweek / Washington Post blog article where Gomaa seeks to define jihad with "a large category of meanings," and where Gomaa states that "Islam forbids suicide" and "Islam forbids aggression against others." (This did not stop Gomaa from defending the terrorist group Hezbollah, as he viewed Hezbollah attacks on Israel as a "defense of its country and not terrorism" and calling for support for Hezbollah as a "religious duty.") On July 24, 2007, the Gulf News reported an update on Gomaa's comments to Newsweek / Washington Post regarding "apostasy," quoting Gomaa: "What I actually said is that Islam prohibits a Muslim from changing his religion and that apostasy is a crime, which must be punished."
Mr. Nawaz further dismisses criticism of Gomaa by using a ploy of playing on assumed political divisions: " n the matter of support for Ali Goma, it seems rather ironic that right-wing critics share their worries over our stance, probably to their horror, with Marxists on the far-left such as the UK Guardian's Seamus Milne." Unfortunately those who think that criticism of Islamic supremacism is merely a right-left issue, fail to understand the issue and certainly fail to understand America's history in fighting supremacist ideologies. Mr. Nawaz should recognize that his experiences with the Nazi Combat 18 group were part of a continuing challenge against supremacist ideologies, and that the battle against supremacism beliefs will not be addressed by inconsistencies or by pandering to inaccurate assumptions about right-left political divisions.
The larger issue that my July 16 article raised is how can an organization that attacks political Islamism, such as Quilliam Foundation, support an individual as Egyptian Grand Mufti Sheik Ali Gomaa, which it calls a "Muslim scholastic giant," when there are numerous articles about Gomaa that would make him a questionable "scholar" to emulate?
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Part of the three-part piece that I am writing for the Middle East Times on Al Qaeda's opportunistic strategy, I explored today Al Qaeda's alleged presence in Lebanon.
In case you missed the first part, you can read it here. You can read part 2 Al Qaeda in Gaza here.
Today's full article is here.
Here is an excerpt:
While Lebanese President Gen. Michel Suleiman was visiting Syrian President Bashar Assad, a terror attack hit Tripoli, Lebanon's second-largest city, killing 18 people, including nine soldiers and injuring over 40. It is still unclear who was behind this bloody attack, but fingers are pointing at Fatah al-Islam, the al-Qaida linked group that fought the Lebanese army in 2007 in the Palestinian camp of Nahr al-Bared. In fact Fatah al-Islam's leader, Shaker al-Absi, recently said he would target the military. But more than anything, it is the growing presence of al-Qaida in Lebanon that is worrying.
As early as 2006, Ahmed Fatfat, then Lebanese interior minister, revealed details about al-Qaida's presence in Lebanon.
Fatfat noted: "For the past 45 months, al-Qaeda has been trying to settle in Lebanon. The organization infiltrates combatants and recruits on the ground. We recently dismantled two groups suspected of belonging to this network. One month ago we stopped 13 individuals coming from various countries of the Middle East, who were preparing attacks inside the country. We also have just stopped five people implied in attacks against military positions."
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I think Peter Bergen's Outlook section piece in the Washington Post was very useful in looking at al Qaeda at 20. It is hard to believe they have been around that long.
Of particular to me is his discussion of the deep differences between Marc Sageman and Bruce Hoffman on the future of al Qaeda. After two decades the nature of the enemy, and how different parts relate to each other, are still in dispute.
Bergen got it right in explaining why the two views, although often presented as such, are not mutually exclusive. As with so much of how we view the new world and its complex and shifting networks and alliances, many in the policy community and intelligence communities want things to be one way or the other. Usually they are not.
This is true in large part because the enemy is constantly moving, realigning and reconfiguring, both in response to the internal dynamics within the groups, and to external pressures. Their Darwinian ability to adapt to survive, and the elimination of their weakest and least careful members, make the task of tracing them ever harder.
The groups will also undergo tests of trial and error (the biggest error, as Bergen points out, being al Qaeda in Iraq's impressive loss of support among the Sunni population because of its increasingly brutal tactics) that will lead to shifting behavior and thinking over time.
While al Qaeda Central, as Bergen and others call the old guard, no longer can exercise the direct command and control that had before, the demise of Al Qaeda in Iraq is largely a boon for bin Laden.
He now has foreign fighters flocking to areas where he exercises the most direct control, again making the core al Qaeda a vital reference point-personally, ideologically and theologically-to those movements.
This is ironic, as al Qaeda in a general sense has lost a great deal of sympathy around the world, as has the Taliban. State sponsorship, such as the Taliban received from Saudi Arabia and Pakistan prior to 9/11, is now considerably less and considerably more muted.
This lack of state sponsorship is one of the driving forces behind the growing ties of these groups to criminal activity. Only resources on the scale gleaned from drug trafficking can fund a significant army for any length of time. This is one of the reasons I feel so strongly that the alliance is both inevitable and incredibly dangerous. My full blog is here.
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As part of his ongoing monitoring and analyzing of the strategic expansion of Hezbollah in Lebanon, military expert Thomas Smith published a series of articles and blogs following up on the build up by the Iranian-backed militia in Lebanon, particularly in the areas north of the Litani river. In his last piece he had a conversation assessment with me on the latest penetration by Hezbollah of the Mount Lebanon areas, north of the Druze districts into the heartland of the Christian areas. It follows another piece about Hezbollah's strenght. Please find the two short blogs here.
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In reflection of the growing intensity of Taliban activity in Pakistan and Afghanistan, over the coming weeks, the NEFA Foundation will be releasing a stream of content drawn from Al-Somood, a monthly Islamic magazine published by the Taliban’s media center. Al-Somood began publication in the summer of 2006, and features a variety of content--including updates on military maneuvers, interviews with senior Taliban leadership figures, and ideological messages calling for the implementation of "martyrdom operations."
In the first translated excerpt now available on the NEFA Foundation website (dated July 2007), Al-Somood interviews Mullah Akhthar Muhammad Mansur, the Taliban’s Military Commander in the Kandahar District. Asked about the number of fighters under his leadership, Mansur said, "In practice, there are 3,500 mujahideen in Kandahar who are fighting the crusaders. However, the number of the mujahideen is much greater than this, but we have armed a limited number among us with weapons and supplies. In the times of necessity this number will be raised easily, because all of the men and the youth in the county carry the spirit of jihad and of sacrifice against the enemy.”
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 The NEFA Foundation has released excerpts of an exclusive interview with Haji Namdar, who was shot to death at a mosque in Khyber Agency on August 13, 2008; (the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan later took credit for the attack). Among the most well-known radical ‘leaders’ in Khyber, Namdar served as head of the now-defunct militant organization "Amr Bilmaroof Wa Nahi Anilmunkar" ("The Movement for Enjoining Good and Forbidding Evil"). He also joined forces with Mangal Bagh, supporting him in the recent clashes against government forces. On June 30, 2008, Namdar’s house was destroyed during the recent military offensive ordered by Islamabad. NEFA interviewed Haji Namadar at an undisclosed location in the Bar Qambarkhel area, Khyber Agency on May 2, 2008, one day after he was unsuccessfully targeted by a Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) suicide bomber.
The video can be viewed on the NEFA Foundation website.
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I was taken by the Washington Post's Anne Applebaum's recent column on the lack of attention that led to the current situation in Georgia.
She points out, rightly, that:
The time to deal with this conflict is not now but was two, or even four, years ago. For a very long time it has been clear that there was a security vacuum in the Caucasus; that this vacuum was dangerous; that war was likely; that Georgia, an eager ally of the United States, would not emerge well from a confrontation; and that a successful invasion of Georgia, a country with U.S. troops on its soil, would reflect badly on the West.
Cowardice, weakness, lack of ideas and, above all, the distraction of other events prevented any deeper engagement. And now it may be too late.
The truth is there is virtually no effort to develop an understanding not just of the world as it is-and the Caucasus, like much of the rest of the world, is not really known in policy and intelligence circles now-but what it may look like in a decade or two.
This has to do with many issues, including the criminal structures, their overlap with terrorist group, the reach these groups have into governments and weapons supplies, what supplies remain available, and what is the present and likely future presence of radical Islam and other violent non-state actors.
There are multiple states that now operate as criminal enterprises (and Russia seems well on its way to joining their ranks) that offer the key havens for the growing criminal-terrorist nexus. For a broader look at these issues, see this paper I did for the NEFA Foundation.
These are different advantages from those offered by truly failed states or regions. Criminal states provide weapons, end-user certificates, travel documents, aircraft registries, banking facilities and much more to groups-including radical Islamist groups-who can buy or talk their way into the game in these havens. My full blog is here.
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This is the fourth article in the series by Madeleine Gruen and Frank Hyland on the threat of terrorism in the United States. In this article we lay out the history of plots and attacks that have taken place in the US since 9-11 in order to respond to the widespread misconception that there have been no terrorist attacks on US soil since that date.
Readers have heard the question “why have there been no terrorist attacks in the US since 9-11-2001” bandied between counter-terrorism professionals on countless occasions. These debates are premised on the false presumption that there have not been any attacks. In fact, there have been a number of attacks and there have been additional plots that did not come to fruition, due to excellent counter-terrorism efforts in some cases and due to the sheer incompetence of the conspirators in other cases. The latter condition does not disparage an incredibly hard-working, bright and dedicated CT Community. However, just as British authorities have learned in the years since 9/11, effort and competence levels evolve and it is important to recognize the patterns before conditions ripen to a point where actors are able to carry out a plot successfully, as was the case on July 7, 2005.
The Al-Qa’ida leadership has told us repeatedly that it intends to attack the United States again. As observers have learned, Al-Qa’ida has a good track record of following through with their threats. Recent history has also shown that when their efforts fail initially they have continued trying until they achieved a “successful” attack. Although somewhat more veiled, and what we might call less “successful,” racist separatist groups have also made near-constant threats. Some have followed through. In this article, we reference plots and attacks that are directly tied to the aforementioned groups, and we also present to you attacks and plots executed by individuals who were inspired by the ideology of recognized terrorist groups.
We acknowledge that one aspect or another of every example we provide to you here may be debated. You may say, “the actor’s motivations may be unclear and therefore difficult to label as terrorism,” or the situation was “all talk.” We are, however, including the following examples because we believe that they are indicative of a pattern and of the aspirations inspired by a particular brand of ideology.
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There are reports that Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf will be stepping down in the next few days in order to avoid impeachment. Musharraf has denied these reports, but the prominence of the rumors indicates strongly that the political balance of power has shifting against Musharraf - he will almost certainly be reduced to a figurehead. It is difficult to say how history will judge Musharraf. From the American perspective he was not adequately taking on Islamic extremism. But from the Pakistani perspective he was becoming an American lackey. The truth is somewhere in between. What Musharraf lacked was either the desire or the capability to take on the systemic problems bedeviling Pakistan. It is possible that with his exit from the scene, a new opportunity to take on these challenges could emerge.
On one level, Musharraf has been cooperative on counter-terror issues, arresting high-profile al-Qaeda and acquiescing to missile strikes on Pakistani territory. However, while missile strikes are a useful tool - they are no substitute for a serious policy. They have also contributed to Musharraf’s loss of standing in Pakistan, since he is seen as subordinating Pakistani sovereignty - and lives (these strikes have, unfortunately, killed civilians) - to American priorities.
On the other hand, Pakistan has not successfully taken control of the tribal areas where al-Qaeda is re-grouping. Americans would be wise to temper their criticism of the Pakistani military’s counter-insurgency efforts.
Read the complete post here.
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In July, Maajid Nawaz, the co-director of the London-based Quilliam Foundation, was in Washington, testifying before the Senate Homeland Security Committee, and speaking at a number of DC think tanks, including the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Mr. Nawaz and his colleague Ed Husain -- the author of the fascinating book "The Islamist" -- formed Quilliam as a "a counter extremism think tank” and are now actively attempting to take on the ideology they previously espoused. A summary of Mr. Nawaz's speech at the Washington Institute is available at: http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2911
In a July 16 posting, Jeffrey Imm took issue with some of Quilliam's stances, including their support for the grand mufti of Egypt. http://counterterrorismblog.org/2008/07/false_reports_on_jihad.php
Mr. Nawaz has written a response to this post and to other criticisms which have been directed at Quilliam. I am posting it on Quilliam's behalf.
"The Right and Wrong Voices," Response by Maajid Nawaz, Co-Director of the Quilliam Foundation
Since being invited to Washington in July 2008, the Quilliam Foundation has received an overwhelming response from supportive voices across the political spectrum. As a result of this work, both Ed Husain and I have been invited to return this September. Our forthcoming trip coincides with Ed Husain’s American launch of his book The Islamist, published by Penguin.
Naturally, and after observing the level of publicity our foundation has enjoyed, some voices have asked more detailed questions about our policies. I have been asked to outline our view on a number of issues ranging from our praise of the Mufti of Egypt, Ali Goma; our stance on a British religious leader Dr. Usama Hassan; our stance on Shari’ah “law” and our selection of Quilliam as a name.
The Quilliam Foundation has no formal links with Mufti Ali Goma of Egypt. However, we have named him on our website as a scholastic giant. Some have asked us whether we know of Mufti Ali Goma’s stance on suicide bombings. Firstly, let me clarify that our view on suicide bombings is on the record. We have explicitly condemned the deliberate targeting of non-combatants, in Israel or anywhere else in the world. Ed Husain directly criticised Qardawi’s fatwa justifying suicide bombings whilst in Qatar for the Doha Debates. Furthermore, I personally challenged Azzam Tamimi - Hamas representative in the UK - on this matter in a studio debate on BBC’s flagship Newsnight with Jeremy Paxman:
http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/component/content/article/51-video/173
It follows, therefore, that we would naturally be concerned if figures we have named as ‘scholastic giants’ were to be discovered as supporting such actions. On July 30th 2008 a letter was sent to Secretary of State Condaleezza Rice by two prominent and respected Senators, Tom Coburn and Jon Kyl. In this letter, the Senator’s referred to a 2003 article in Egypt’s “Al-Haqiqa” newspaper quoting Ali Goma defending terrorist acts in Israel. The respected Senator’s have cited Rabinowitz, Beila and William Mayer from their paper entitled “State Department Funding ISNA’s Propagation of Islam via citizen exchange program” (Pipe Line News, 25 April 2008) as a reference for this allegation against Ali Goma.
Since these questions were raised I did my own research. I have found this source referred to by Rabinowitz, Beila and William Mayer. It is a secondary source that does not quote Ali Goma directly. Rather surprisingly, it is also a Wahabite-Islamist source, being a newspaper that explicitly promotes a Shari’ah-law based Caliphate and attacks Shi’ah Muslims as heretics. I felt, therefore, that it would be helpful for people to know who they are being asked to rely on for evidence. The following extract is taken from an article stating that by far the biggest ‘danger to Islam’ in Egypt is the modernising agenda of Mufti Ali Goma, due to his articulate, learned and popular approach to reform issues:
http://www.haqeeqa.com/index.aspx?status=prodetail&aid=690
يكتسب مصداقية بمخالفة الرأي الرسمي للحكومة والدولة مثل رأيه في العمليات الاستشهادية مثلاً واعتبار من يقول بحرمتها أنه حمار ـ أعزكم الله ـ وذلك بعد تصريح شيخ الأزهر بأنها انتحار محرم بأقل من أسبوع, في تحدي واضح لرأس المؤسسة الدينية في مصر
He (Ali Goma) is not like his predecessor, whose religion was simply the religion of the government of the day. If such a government made something permissible (Halal), he too would make it permissible. If they were to deem something forbidden (Haram), so would he. Consequently, he (Ali Goma) tries to win over credibility by conflicting with the official state and government opinion on matters. An example of this is his opinion on martyrdom [sic] operations, and his view that those who consider them prohibited are like donkeys - may God dignify you. As a clear challenge to the head of Egypt’s theological institution, Ali Goma’s proclamation came after the statement made by the Mufti of Azhar, by less than a week, holding that such operations are to be considered prohibited suicide (Haram).
Contrary to this secondary, hostile and extremist Wahhabist-Islamist source above, we have Mufti Ali Goma’s own words. Below, he explicitly condemns suicide bombings as quoted by him directly in a reliable and professional American news magazine, Newsweek:
As for suicide bombing, Islam forbids suicide; it forbids the taking of one’s own life. In addition, Islam forbids aggression against others. Attacking civilians, women, children, and the elderly by blowing oneself up is absolutely forbidden in Islam. No excuse can be made for the crimes committed in New York, Spain, and London, and anyone who tries to make excuses for these acts is ignorant of Islamic law (shari’ah), and their excuses are a result of extremism and ignorance
http://newsweek.washingtonpost.com/onfaith/muslims_speak_out/2007/07/sheikh_ali_gomah.html
To clarify, my claim is not that Mufti Ali Goma categorically did not support suicide bombings. In the citation above, for example, he did not explicitly mention Israel. My claim is, rather, that the evidence available and cited is definitely insufficient to popularise such a serious accusation at this moment. Mufti Ali Goma must stand innocent until proven guilty. If proven to have endorsed such a tactic, the Quilliam Foundation will be the first to concede his serious and grave error, but we will not accept it based upon Wahhabite-Islamists’ say so, and consequently Goma’s own and general condemnation in Newsweek still stands.
On the matter of support for Ali Goma, it seems rather ironic that right-wing critics share their worries over our stance, probably to their horror, with Marxists on the far-left such as the UK Guardian’s Seamus Milne, who cites the same concern in a scathing attack on our Foundation’s work here:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/jul/17/islam.race
Moving on, another question raised has been that of our gratitude for having Dr. Usama Hassan as one of our official advisors. Dr. Usama Hassan has also travelled the same path of extremism in his youth, only to mature into a progressive and enlightened voice for moderation today. He recently participated alongside Ed Hussain in an official Foreign Office delegation to Egypt to represent a more British understanding of our faith, and is now one of the leading theological voices for British Islam.
Concerns have been raised about Dr Usama’s father, Shaikh Shu’aib Hassan, who is a very conservative voice amongst Britain’s Muslim communities. Suffice to say that Dr Usama is not his father, and Shaikh Shu’aib is not Dr Usama. Dr Usama respectfully disagrees with his father on many of the problematic issues of our day. On the Caliphate, Dr Usama Hassan has stated clearly, and without reservation, in his Quilliam Foundation launch speech - only 10 minutes long and on our website - that he believes in Secularism, and that secularism was indeed always a part of traditional Islam.
http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/component/content/article/51-video/150 )
Consequently, Dr Usama believes in using the name Caliphate to reclaim Muslim secularism through it, as he believes that past Caliphates always were secular in nature. The Quilliam Foundation is concerned with substantively challenging those who wish to adopt Shari’ah as state law, not with those who merely use the word Caliphate to mean a secular state; for that would be an exercise in semantics. On this note, it is perhaps pertinent to state that the Quilliam Foundation has time and time again criticised and challenged those who call for ‘Islamist Supremacism’, or the belief that the Shari’ah must be dominant as state law.
Another question raised by some quarters is the concern that William Quilliam, after whom we named our foundation, was an Islamist. Right-wing commentator’s may again be horrified to learn that this claim was first made by the far-left in the UK alongside Hizb ut-Tahrir UK activists in their desperate claim to traditional legitimacy.
Such an anachronistic allegation has already been dealt with on our website. We believe that William Quilliam was a political activist who had no ideological agenda, and no ideology. He hailed from a time of empire and thus spoke and behaved in accordance to the imperial politics of his day. In a typically British manner, he engaged in localised charity and localised politics, challenging his government where necessary. The Quilliam Foundation is not interested in making Muslims apolitical. We are solely interested in encouraging Muslims to engage politically as citizens, challenging where necessary, but with no ideological baggage. I am sure that readers can differentiate between the need for genuine checks and balances and between avoiding an ideologically driven fifth columnist approach. Naturally, like all, William Quilliam was a prisoner to the discourse of the era in which he was born. At no stage, however, did he make the Islamist claim that Islam was a political ideology, unlike the later founders of Islamism; Banna, Nabhani and Qutb. A rebuttal of the anachronistic claim that he was an Islamist is found on our website here:
http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/BritainsFirstMuslimActivist.htm
In conclusion, we ask that people on the left and right join with us in our commitment to encourage true pluralism in Muslim political discourse, to support non-Islamist voices, to challenge the ideology and discourse of Islamism and to engender normal politics as alternatives to Islamism. As far as practicable, the right people must be encouraged and the wrong ones must be criticised. We caution that this work, vital though it is, must be tempered with a jealous protection of our liberties, especially freedom of religion and thought, rigorous academic standards and a deep understanding of the theological, ideological and social states of Islam and Muslims today. If we fail in these lofty standards we risk tarnishing the liberal alternative and losing the authority to speak as well as the moral high-ground from which to invite others.
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Over the last few weeks French and Italian sources have spoken of the possible end of the so-called “Mitterand doctrine.” The doctrine, created in the early 1980s by then French President François Mitterrand, granted asylum to those members of the Red Brigades and other Italian left-wing terrorist groups who renounced violence, or, as Mitterand said in a famous speech in 1985, “broke with the infernal machine” of terrorism. Despite predictable and intense criticism from Italian authorities, the policy has been observed by all French government after Mitterand, whether socialist or conservative. Since the 1980s many (some claim more than three hundred) Italian militants have benefited from the policy, creating a new life for themselves across the Alps. For many of them the statute of limitations has run out and they are, therefore, free from the reach of Italian justice. But others, whom Italian authorities sentenced to life in prison or want for crimes to which the statute of limitations does not apply, have not been so lucky.
Since 2002, in fact, Italian authorities have engaged in a new legal/political battle to obtain the extradition of some of the militants. Two high-profile assassinations carried out by the so-called New Red Brigades led the Italians to re-focus their attention on left-wing terrorism and some links to militants who had received asylum in France were uncovered. A list of a dozen names, some of them accused of still being engaged in terrorism, was handed by the Italians to their French counterparts and new extradition requests were lodged. The requests triggered complicated and highly controversial legal battles in French courts. While no militant had been extradited until then, in 2002 French authorities handed over Paolo Persichetti, who had been sentenced in Italy to 22 years for his role in the 1987 assassination of Air Force General Licio Giorgieri. In March 2005, the French State Council expressly stated that the Mitterand doctrine had no legal value. Most recently, Nicolas Sarkozy has declared that the Mitterand doctrine goes against the spirit of judicial cooperation between European countries and declared his intention of breaking with it. Right now French judicial authorities are deciding the complicated case of former Red Brigades member Marina Petrella, convicted for murder by Italy in 1992, jailed by France in August 2007 after 15 year in the country, and currently awaiting extradition to Italy. Sarkozy has expressed his desire to extradite Petrella, but also asked Italian President Giorgio Napolitano to pardon the former Red Brigades militant (the move has led some French leftists to dub Sarkozy as a modern day Pontius Pilate…).
Western countries providing asylum/tolerating the presence of terrorists wanted in other Western countries and even turning a blind eye to their continued activities is hardly a French exclusive. The now popular term “Londonistan” was coined (together with Beirut-on-the-Thames) in the mid-1990s, ironically, by French intelligence officials upset at the British government’s policy of harboring Islamist terrorists, including those who France deemed responsible for the 1995 bombings of the Paris metro. By the same token, Britain has had similar complaints towards the attitude of the U.S. government. London has accused Washington of providing a safe haven for Irish terrorists from as early as the 1850s, when hundred of “Fenians” formed groups in the United States to carry out attacks against Britain. And Italians, who have been so quick at criticizing the French, tolerated the activities of Palestinian terrorists on their soil for decades (just yesterday Italian daily Corriere della Sera ran an interesting interview with former PFLP spokesman Bassam Abu Sharif in which the militant openly recounted how Italian secret services allowed his and other Palestinian groups to operate in the country and transport weapons in exchange for the promise not to attack Italy—the fact has been recently confirmed by former Italian President and Prime Minister Francesco Cossiga, who even said that the 1980 bombing of the Bologna station, which killed 85 people, could have been the result of the accidental detonation of two suitcases of explosives Palestinian militants were transporting by train).
The Mitterand doctrine presents differences from these cases, as its precondition was that only those who renounced violence could benefit from it. Its defenders claim that the Italian militants who have moved to France under its auspices have built families and lived a peaceful life since then and cannot pay for crimes committed more than 30 years earlier. Moreover, they claim that the French state cannot fail to maintain its promise and turn its back on those who relied on its word 25 years ago. Its critics counter these arguments with the right of the victims’ families to see justice been served. Moreover, judicial cooperation on extraditions and the respect of other member countries’ sentences have become cornerstones of the EU counter-terrorism strategy and the Mitterand doctrine runs directly athwart them. Soon France will decide on the Petrella case and, probably, on other similar, showing which argument will prevail.
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I am posting an article I titled "South Ossetia, the Perfect Wrong War." In the current hot debate about the South Ossetia-Georgia conflict there are two main trends in the West:
1. Western frustration: To consider Russia's aggressive response as part of a renewed Cold war and thus a signal for the West to mobilize against the Russians, again.
2. Anti-American Critics: To consider US policy as responsible for this and other crises and thus the need to change this policy.
3. Strategic Wisdom: I am suggesting a third way to look at it through the big picture of our War on Terror and how to deal with such conflicts. This thesis may not attractive to the previous main trends, but it would be wise to consider in a post 9/11 era.
The ongoing debate in the West and particularly in the US is showing revealing trends. The critics of the War on terror blame the US. The supporters of the War on Terror split in two camps. One platform recommending an all out mobilization against Moscow, while the Coalition is battling the Jihadists in Iraq and Afghanistan and dealing with Iran. And another platform advising to smartly contain the current crisis with Russia and focus on the confrontation with the Jihadi forces. The latter forces of course would be delighted to see the US engaging in two global conflicts instead of one. They will be delighted even more, if the US (and the West) would suspend the War on Terror and re-engage in a new Cold war. Here is the essay.
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A written report released yesterday and an oral briefing provide expert and eyewitness testimony about the security improvements in Iraq and the potential that lack of political progress could imperil the country's security and result in a renewed Sunni insurgency.
John Nagl, Colin Kahl, and Shawn Brimley of the Center for a New American Security briefed a group of invited guests on their findings during their recent trip to Iraq. They traveled there at the invitation of General Petraeus and received high-level briefings, visited multiple provinces, and spoke with numerous Iraqi politicians and citizens. Nagl recently retired after 20 years in the U.S. Army, and his last assignment was as Commanding Officer of 1st Battalion, 34th Armor at Fort Riley, Kansas. He led a tank platoon in Operation Desert Storm and served as the operations officer of a tank battalion task force in Operation Iraqi Freedom. A West Point graduate and Rhodes Scholar, Nagl earned his doctorate from Oxford University, and contributed to the Army's new Counterinsurgency Field Manual.
They discussed the continued operations near Mosul against Al Qaeda, whose attacks there was discussed on August 4 and on May 31 by Evan Kohlmann. Al Qaeda is estimated to have 800-900 personnel near Mosul. Although infiltration from Anbar province has been sharply reduced, more US combat forces might be needed in Mosul, in part because we are not yet seeing the local support that we have received in Anbar. Overall, the north is still in the "clearing" phase, one to two years behind the rest of country. Al Qaeda is more sophisticated there than it was in Anbar; they aren't targeting civilians (see Evan's May 3 post on the allegations by other Sunni groups) and they're positioning themselves as "protectors of the Sunni way of life" against "Kurdish ambitions."
They three described the security improvements in Iraq brought about by the surge as "remarkable," and Al Qaeda and Iranian militant groups have been degraded and are not a viable strategic threat at this point. But their opinion is that very few of the fundamental political grievances have been resolved.
They described Prime Minister Maliki as "slowrolling" the integration of Sunnis and not reconciling with the most important Sunni groups. They cited the lack of accommodation with the "Sons of Iraq" (SoI), a group of thousands of Sunnis with whom U.S. forces have forged constructive relationships in the past two years. We are paying many of the SoI and want to place 16,000 into the Iraqi Security Forces by the end of this year, but the Interior Ministry has accepted only 600 so far (see this Long War Journal article on the SoI). The briefers described a vetting process by which we give the Interior Ministry the names of candidates, but only Shia candidates are accepted, not the SoI.
The latest edition of "The Iraq Report" by the Institute for the Study of War and the Weekly Standard details the positive impact of the U.S.-SoI relationship in clearing Al Qaeda out of Diyala.
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I am not a Russia expert and defer to Robert Kagan and others to paint the macro picture of what Russia's incursion into Georgia means.
But there are several issues, outside of these, that need to be looked at in terms of Russia in the greater world, and our relationship to Russia, particularly in counter-terrorism and weapons proliferation issues.
What is clear is that Russia is set on selling weapons to those who want very badly to hurt us, and who buy their weapons with the stated purpose of using them for that.
Everyone sells weapons, and yes, the United States plays in the game. But Russia's willingness to arm non-state actors and states that are facing international sanction is qualitatively different.
The three clearest examples are the arming Hezbollah in the summer 2006 conflict (courtesy of their favorite delivery person with almost-plausible deniability, Viktor Bout); Venezuela, which recently purchased an additional $2 billion worth of weapons from Russia, in addition to the $4.4 billion already purchased in the past four years-including two AK-47 factories; and Iran, receiving advanced missile systems.
As noted above, Chavez's pitch for purchasing the weapons was the formation of an anti-US coalition with strategic interests in Latin America. My full blog is here.
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This afternoon, the Washington Institute hosted Ted Gistaro, the National Intelligence Officer for Transnational Threats as part of its 2007-2008 lecture series with senior US government counterterrorism officials. Mr. Gistaro provided a comprehensive assessment on how the US and its allies are doing, nearly seven years after the September 11 attacks, in its efforts to defeat al Qaeda.
Here is an excerpt of Mr. Gistaro's prepared remarks:
We assess that greatly increased worldwide counterterrorism efforts over the past five years have constrained the ability of al-Qaeda to attack the United States and our allies and have led terrorist groups to perceive the Homeland in particular as a harder target to strike than on 9/11. These security measures have helped disrupt known plots against the United States since 9/11. That said, al-Qaeda remains the most serious terrorist threat to the United States, and we remain in the heightened threat environment we noted in the July 2007 National Intelligence Estimate.
• We are not aware of any specific, credible al-Qaeda plot to attack the U.S. homeland. But we do receive a steady stream of threat reporting from sources of varying creditability, which the U.S. Intelligence Community is investigating aggressively.
• As the election nears, we expect to see an uptick in such threat reporting -- of varying credibility -- regarding possible attacks.
• We also expect to see an increase in al-Qaeda's propaganda efforts, especially around the anniversary of the attacks of September 11, 2001, which has often been a hook for such propaganda statements. In Osama bin Laden's September 2007 address to the "American people," he labeled the democratic system "a failure." He claimed that there is no difference between Democratic or Republican candidates winning presidential or congressional elections so long as "big corporations" support candidates.
We assess that al-Qaeda's intent to attack the U.S. homeland remains undiminished. Attack planning continues and we assess it remains focused on hitting prominent political, economic, and infrastructure targets designed to produce mass casualties, visually dramatic destruction, and significant economic and political aftershocks.
To read the rest of Mr. Gistaro's prepared remarks click here:
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Media sources are reporting that Pakistan security forces have killed the general head of al Qaeda in Afghanistan, Shaykh Mustafa Abu al-Yazid (a.k.a. “Shaykh Saeed” and "Abu Saeed al-Masri"), in in a clash in the Bajaur tribal area in northwestern Pakistan. If confirmed, this would be a major triumph for Pakistani forces and an important blow to al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan. As Evan Kohlmann reported in his NEFA Foundation dossier posted on June 6, al-Yazid was a co-founder of al-Qaida in 1989 and is considered quite close to Al-Qaida Deputy Commander Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri. He has been implicated by other Al-Qaida members in sworn testimony as playing a critical role in the financing and coordination of Al-Qaida’s international terrorist operations, including allegedly the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States. It was al-Yazid who made numerous important announcements from al Qaeda to the world, including al Qaeda's claim of responsibility for the assassination of Benazir Bhutto and the recent killing of Egyptian Al-Qaida commander "Abu Khabab al-Masri" (a.k.a. Midhat Mursi al-Sayyid Umar) in a U.S. airstrike.
As with all media reports of the deaths of major al Qaeda figures, we need to wait for confirmation of al-Yazid's death. The SITE Intelligence Group reports, "Jihadists on password-protected al-Qaeda-affiliated forums such as al-Ekhlaas and al-Hesbah have expressed their skepticism with the reports of Yazid’s death, and await confirmation from al-Qaeda or al-Fajr Media Center."
NEFA Foundation Photo of al-Yazid
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Part of the three-part piece that I am writing for the Middle East Times on Al Qaeda's opportunistic strategy, I explored today Al Qaeda's alleged presence in Gaza.
In case you missed the first part, you can read it here.
You can read today's whole article here.
Here is an excerpt:
One of the alleged al-Qaida linked terror groups is the 400-man strong Army of Islam (AI). AI emerged for the first time in June 2006 with the kidnapping of Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit, in conjunction with Hamas. AI then claimed responsibility for the kidnapping of BBC journalist Alan Johnston in Gaza. While the organization denies being a part of al-Qaida, it acknowledges that it is influenced by al-Qaida, but does not have direct links to it.
Another of these jihadist groups that have recently surfaced, the Army of Believers, is holding the same speech: "We have no organic links with al-Qaida, but we share its ideology. Our goal is not only to liberate Palestine, but to spread Islam everywhere." It is obviously difficult to know how far the connection goes with al-Qaida, but what is sure is that there is a breeding ground in Gaza for such groups. In fact, according to Samir Zoquout, from the Human rights group al-Mezan: "One cannot say if al-Qaida is really present here, but more and more groups are adopting its radical ideology, sometimes as a cover for criminal activities."
But there is a worrisome trend: these jihadist groups are gaining strength. The jihadists feed on the decision of Hamas to become a party in government, in a territory where the Sharia (Islamic law) is not applied. Also some are very unhappy about the recent truce concluded with Israel.
Therefore, Hamas has lost members of its armed wing to the Brigades of Allah or the Islamic Army of Jerusalem that killed a Palestinian Christian and attacked an American school, which was holding a show featuring a coed crowd of boys and girls aged six to 12. In this attack, one bodyguard was killed and seven people were injured including three children after the terrorists started shooting.
But that is not all: the French daily Le Figaro recently revealed that a few dozen foreigners, including half a dozen Frenchmen, entered from Egypt in January 2008, during the 11 days when the border with Gaza was forced open.
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In the week since the Global Muslim Brotherhood Daily Report (free registration required) revealed the ties of Mazen Asbahi to Muslim Brotherhood legacy groups and his immediate resignation as an adviser to the Obama campaign, it has been fascinating to watch the Brotherhood response, particularly those of CAIR and the Muslim Student Association.
This is relevant because of the MB's historical ties to radical Islamist terrorism and the ties of members of legacy groups in the United States to multiple terrorist cases, investigations, etc. The line of inquiry would have been just as valid had Mr. Asbahi surfaced in the McCain camp, or any major political campaign.
(For a more complete look at these groups and their history in the United States, see this report I did for the NEFA Foundation during the Holy Land Foundation trial).
The tactics have been familiar to any who follow these groups: attack the messenger, despite the fact that the postings simply laid out Mr. Ashbahi's multiple ties to MB groups, based on SEC filing and public records-and made no allegations of any illegality or impropriety; attack the Wall Street Journal and Glenn Simpson for following up on the report, and having the nerve to call Mr. Asbahi for comment (which is now described as a right-wing expose-in-the-making, as if belonging to FOUR-not one MB groups, as has been widely reported-were not worthy of comment, or a story when the resignation happened); blame the media et al for Mr. Asbahi's resignation, as if an e-mailed question about the relationship from a journalist were somehow an unacceptable practice in seeking information; and paint the entire thing as anti-Muslim bash-fest by the far right (see this wildly inaccurate and deceptive piece by James Zogby in the Huffington Post; and, finally, fail to address ANY of the substantive issues such associations raise.
For a good critique of the Zogby piece and its factual misrepresentations of the original piece, go here.
One of the favorite tactics is to paint those pushing back against CAIR et al as right-wing zealots. Fortunately, that is not true, although it resonates among many in the Obama camp because it paints the issue, falsely, as one of civil rights.
Rep. Brad Sherman (D-CA), who recently invited Steve Emerson to testify at a hearing where I was also a witness, refused to buckle to the the groups' pressure tactics and protests aimed a silencing Emerson. See this Action Alert for a taste of their language.
Sens. Charles Schumer, Barbara Boxer and Richard Durbin-hardly the right-wing fringe of American politics-have distanced themselves from CAIR and other MB groups, and noted the ties to terrorism and HAMAS. So, another lie, but one that lives on. My full blog, including a reprint of the GMBDR factual outline of events, can be found here.
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The conflict over South Ossetia -and possibly over Abkhazia's- regions is dangerous development in international stability and particularly for the efforts deployed worldwide in the campaign against Terror forces. For this local ethnic and territorial confrontation, involving now Georgia and the Russian Federation has the potential of absorbing energies and resources, otherwise needed and applied elsewhere in resisting Jihadi offensives and networks.
Georgia is an important ally in the US-led coalition overseeing the stabilization of Iraq and the containing of Khomeinist offensive in that country. An escalation over South Ossetia and Abkhazia will lead (and has already significantly) to a full withdrawal of Georgia from Iraq and eventually drawing US and other Western diplomatic efforts and resources for the defense of Georgia in the Caucuses. This will weaken the position in Iraq, in the Middle East and open an unnecessary front in a different region against a superpower, also drawn into the conflict because of local conflicts.
Russia and the West have a series of disagreement on the "War on Terror" so far. Moscow and Washington didn't see eye to eye in Iraq and are not at ease on the issue of anti-missiles systems in central Europe. It is not wise, strategically to open a military front -via proxies- against the Russian Federation in the Caucuses. While many in Washington and Brussels are still in Cold War mood, we need to realize that present day Russia is also at war with the Jihadi-Wahabi networks. Beyond and above the Chechen crisis, al Qaeda and the Salafi combat movement -chief enemy of the West (US and Western Europe combined) wants Russia down as much as they wish to see liberal democracies defeated. Thus, it is not in the interest of the US-led efforts against worldwide Jihadi forces to engage in a strategic confrontation with Russia, despite all the latter's negative behavior on many issues worldwide. The West needs to rationalize fully at this stage where the so-called "War on terror" is not going extremely well.
Thus it is suggested to move forward and quickly with two main parameters: On the one hand stand by Georgia as a staunch ally of the West and make sure its sovereignty and security are protected. On the other hand stop any potential conflict with Russia in the Caucuses and find a solution which would bring justice to the local parties and encourage Moscow to divert its resources from borders crisis to a world campaign against what is more dangerous to all democracies -old ones and transitional ones. This last effort may not be easy but is crucial if we wish to keep the focus on the greater conflict against Jihadist totalitarianism. Hence, it is suggested to quickly apply in South Ossetia what Americans and Europeans have applied in Kosovo so that local wounds are healed and regional stability is reaffirmed. Here is the model based on the Balkans resolution process.
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My paper titled "South Asia: Hotbed of Islamic Terrorism", published in the latest issue of the NBR Analysis (The National Bureau of Asian Research, Vol. 19 (4), August 2008, explores the rising menace of Islamic extremism in South Asia while discussing key terrorist groups, networks, and emerging terrorism trends throughout the region.
South Asia has been confronting the challenge of Islamic extremism for many years. At least four South Asian countries—India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and, most recently, the Maldives (each with large Muslim populations)—are considered hotbeds of Islamic terrorism. In both Pakistan and Bangladesh, radical Islamic forces aim to establish Islamic states based on Islamic laws. This region has the highest concentration of Islamic jihadist groups in the world: a rough estimate is that nearly one hundred Islamic extremist groups and jihadi organizations with cross-border linkages are operating with impunity throughout South Asia. India tops the list with more than 50 active or dormant terrorist tanzeems (organizations). Several anti-India and anti-Hindu Islamic groups fighting in Kashmir are based in Pakistan or Bangladesh. Many of these groups have ties with international jihadi organizations based in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Uzbekistan, including al Qaeda, the Taliban, and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU).
This essay explores how South Asian countries, in particular India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, are grappling with Islamic extremism, especially since the catastrophic events of September 11. This essay identifies major terrorist groups and discusses intricate terror networks, their operational developments, and emerging terrorist trends in three country-specific sections. Despite concerted efforts by government forces, including the U.S.-led campaign in South Asia, Islamic terrorism is on the rise, with a new generation of terrorist leaders taking the reins of jihad in their hands throughout the region. The essay also finds that South Asian terrorist groups increasingly prefer to work collectively, even when there is little ideological convergence among their objectives.
For Full Text
The issue titled Aspects of Islamism in South and Southeast Asia has three papers:
Introduction: Islamism and U.S. Policy in South and Southeast Asia by Robert W. Hefner
South Asia: Hotbed of Islamic Terrorism by Animesh Roul
The Fluid Terrain of Islamism in Southeast Asia by Joseph Chinyong Liow
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In a video accusing China’s Communist Government of “mistreating Muslims” a Jihadi group threatened to attack the Summer Games in Beijin. A spokesman of the Turkistan Islamic Party accuses China of “forcing Muslims into atheism and destroying Islamic schools. The “Turkistan Islamic Party” is most likely based across the border in Pakistan, where sources affirm it received training from Al Qaeda.
Weeks ago the organization claimed responsibility for a bombings across the country. The latest video shows graphics of a burning Olympics logo and explosions. This week, attackers killed 16 police and wounded more than a dozen in the Xinjiang city of Kashgar using homemade bombs.
But according to AP reports few months ago, Chinese Police broke up a terror plot targeting the Beijing Olympics while a flight crew foiled attempt to crash a Chinese plane. Per Communist Party officials in the North Western province of Xinjiang, materials seized in a January 27 raid in the regional capital, Urumqi, suggested the plotters' planned "specifically to sabotage the staging of the Beijing Olympics." Earlier reports said police found guns, homemade bombs, training materials and "extremist religious ideological materials" during the January raid in Urumqi, in which two members of the gang were killed and 15 arrested. The immediate question becomes: Is China targeted by a Terror organization? And since the material found was characterized as “extremist religious ideological”, does that mean it is al Qaeda or one of its affiliate? The answer to these questions could change the face of geopolitics in Asia.
Interestingly the Associated Press runs to frame the Terrorists to a local ethnic conflict in one of China’s Western provinces. AP wrote: “Chinese forces have for years been battling a low-intensity separatist movement among Xinjiang's Uighurs, a Turkic Muslim people who are culturally and ethnically distinct from China's Han majority.” The news agency has tried to set the agenda of the debate by scoring three points for the “radicals.” They are separatists, they are representative of a local ethnicity and they are Muslim. In addition the description of the struggle is informative: Chinese forces versus a Uighur movement. In a way a parallel to Kosovo, Chechnya and Kashmir with two projected effects. As framed by AP, the struggle of these “Terrorists” is indeed legitimate even though the means are violent. But is it the case?
Evidently the Chinese Communists are repressive against all other minorities and political dissidents. But as in Russia and India’s Wahabi cases, one would investigate if these particular Terrorists in China are local patriotic elements with liberal outlook. Not really. As under the Russians in Chechnya it looks like the Communists in China are battling another form of totalitarianism to come: Jihadism.
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Ten years ago, on August 7, 1998, Al-Qaeda conducted simultaneous car bombings of U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. Over 250 died in these attacks, including 10 Americans at the U.S. embassy in Nairobi, and 6000 were reported injured. The August 7, 2008 East African Standard reports that new intelligence reports show that the Al-Qaeda terrorists planned in Nairobi "to use a device twice as big as the one that exploded." The Kenyan Daily Nation reported that 300 of the injured subsequently died. The majority of the victims of the embassy bombings were African civilians.
But despite that terrible human tragedy and the thousands of pages of documents, indictments, reports, and studies on the 1998 embassy bombings, we still have many today who refuse to confront the ideology behind Jihadist terrorism.
On the 10th anniversary of this tragedy, Kenyan Prime Minister Raila sought to reassure Kenyans that "this Government will do everything possible to prevent us from ever again being attacked." The Kenyan Daily Nation further reported that the prime minister also would not face any "specific groups" that might support such a Jihadist ideology. Prime Minister Raila did not offer any initiatives to challenge the ideologies of Islamic supremacism or Islamism that provides the basis for Jihadist action, but instead focused of "extremism" and "disaffection" as the causes for this tragedy.
As reported by the August 7, 2008 Daily Nation, Prime Minister Raila indicated: "But he ruled out the possibility of targeting specific groups on the war on terror, saying it would be counter-productive. 'It would generate the very disaffection and extremism on which terror thrives. It would be sheer madness to target it, or its followers. Kenya will never do so. Our sole target is terrorists.'" The Kenya Broadcasting Corporation also reported: "He dispelled allegations that the terrorists were acting in the name of Islam, or that the government's anti-terror efforts were directed at Muslims. Raila said the whole world knew that Islam was a religion of peace, adding that its very name was derived from peace."
AFP also reported that President Bush observed the anniversary of the attacks by stating that it "reinforces the need to confront the terrorists, to work with our allies to bring them to justice, and to prevent such attacks from happening again." Meantime, the U.S. 2008 National Defense Strategy is based solely on fighting "extremists," in keeping with the DHS/NCTC "terror lexicon" recommendations on not using any terms such as "Jihad," "Islamist," etc.
The alleged Al-Qaeda mastermind of the 1998 embassy bombings, Fazul Abdullah Mohammed, remains at large. In addition, at least seven others named in the embassy bombing indictment are also at large. Four of the Al-Qaeda bombers were sentenced to life in prison in 2001, and two are reportedly being held at Guantanamo Bay detention center (Ahmed Ghailani and Mamdouh Mahmud Salim). The Guardian reported on August 4, 2008 that "Fazul Abdullah Mohammed, who has a $5m bounty from the US on his head, was reported to have left his hideout in the coastal resort town of Malindi shortly before a raid on Saturday night." In an ongoing manhunt in Kenya for Fazul Abdullah Mohammed, police have subsequently arrested five and are seeking another man for questioning.
With the 10th anniversary of the U.S. embassy bombings and ongoing manhunt for Fazul Abdullah Mohammed, Kenyan Daily Nation has been publishing a series of reports that are allegedly from a diary kept by Fazul that was on a laptop captured by the Kenyan authorities. On August 4 and August 5, the Daily Nation published stories "Diary of a terrorist: Fazul's journey to Pakistan," "Fazul's military quest lands him in Afghanistan," and "Fazul joins camp to begin Jihad." In the alleged diary excepts, Fazul reportedly states that he was led to Islamic supremacism by "the Sudanese school of thought [that] emerged... [that] consisted of a mixture of Muslim Brotherhood and Salafist ideas." (This is the same Muslim Brotherhood that Peter Mandaville has urged engagement with in West Point publications and the same Salafists that Matthew Levitt has suggested "have credibility when it comes to deradicalizing others.") In addition, the McClatchy newspaper chain has done a feature article on the Daily Nation's "Diary of a terrorist" series. These "diary" reports could certainly be apocryphal. But legitimate or not, the willingness of the Daily Nation to publish such anti-American screeds without also offering a challenge to the ideology of the Islamic supremacism behind them is troubling.
The alleged diary quotes by embassy bomber Fazul Abdullah Mohammed reportedly include: "We must, of course, raise our children with the love of jihad. We have to raise a new generation with an education totally opposed to the Western education that is imposed on us."
This quote concisely demonstrates the root of the problem with Islamic supremacism in general as a supremacist ideology that rejects values of equality and liberty, and seeks to promote an alternative Islamic supremacist value system. Such Islamic supremacist goals remain the root cause and motivation behind the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings, even though Prime Minister Raila and President Bush don't understand that as they continue to only tactically pursue "extremists" and "terrorists," without ever honestly asking why so many died.
Ten years is a long time to clearly remember such a tragedy.
"Never again" eventually becomes "never mind." Our national outrage at Jihadists and their ideology has transformed into national policies that merely seek to discourage "extremism," and many of our government leaders don't care that no one can define what "extremism" is.
If these are the circumstances 10 years after the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings, will we be having the same discussion on September 11, 2011 as well?
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I've covered the use of extremist textbooks at the Islamic Saudi Academy in Fairfax County in northern Virginia since May, when the county supervisors voted to continue to allow ISA to lease county property even though it uses textbooks which included virulently anti-Semitic and anti-Christian language and teachings. The county punted the issue back to the State Department, which has refused to act on recommendations in 2007 by the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom to close ISA unless the school materially changed the textbooks to remove the hateful language. Neither did the State Department act when USCIRF issued a new report reiterating that ISA's textbooks "extremely troubling passages that do not conform to international human rights norms." In late June, the county supervisors refused to revoke the ISA's lease of county property and punted the issue again back to the State Department, even though it could have done so without penalty. Congressman Frank Wolf, who represents the ares in the House, became involved and wrote letters to Secretary Rice in June and in July, urging her to determine what is being taught at the school and what to do about it.
Having not received a satisfactory response to either letter, Rep. Wolf wrote again last week, this time with more ammo to try to force the State Department into decisive action. He commissioned a special independent study of the legal status of the ISA by the Congressional Research Service (an issue which Patrick Poole examined on his website and I did here). That study concluded that the ISA qualifies as a "foreign mission" under U.S. law, since it is "substantially owned or effectively controlled by...a foreign government," namely the Saudis. Accordingly, the State Department can order ISA off the county property if the Secretary determines "that such divestiture is 'necessary to protectthe interests of the United States.'" Rep. Wolf again called for Secretary Rice "to convene a meeting of relevant State Department and USCIRF representatives... to conclusively determine what precisely is being taught at ISA."
As I wrote on June 12, the ISA and its 1999 valedictorian, Ahmed Omar Abu Ali, represent a case study in the process by which American-raised Muslims morph into Islamic jihadists ("homegrown radicalization."). Yet the State Department and Fairfax County supervisors duck, hide, and punt the issue back and forth, failing to act in the best interests of county citizens and the U.S. This is my seventh post on this issue since May, and I am no more optimistic that they will act than I was in May.
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The quick departure of a Muslim adviser to the Obama campaign after disclosure of his ties to one or more of the many unindicted co-conspirators in the Holy Land Foundation criminal case is not just a campaign decision. It's a precedent for management guidance next year for components of the Justice Department. It doesn't have to be complicated, just something like "No component of the Department of Justice will enter into any contract, grant, or agreement with any person or entity which is an unindicted co-coinspirator in a federal criminal case brought by the Department of Justice." And that should be extended by the Office of Management and Budget to cover all Executive Branch agencies. Such a policy need not have anything to do with CAIR's grounding in the international Islamist Muslim Brotherhood network or the questionable associations and criminal convictions of several CAIR officials. (I think those associations should come into play, but we've already asserted that on this website.)
After all, the naming of an unindicted co-conspirator is no small matter; it's actively discouraged by the Justice Department. The U.S. Attorneys Manual at DOJ advises federal prosecutors to avoid naming them. "The practice of naming individuals as unindicted co-conspirators in an indictment charging a criminal conspiracy has been severely criticized in United States v. Briggs, 514 F.2d 794 (5th Cir. 1975). Ordinarily, there is no need to name a person as an unindicted co-conspirator in an indictment in order to fulfill any legitimate prosecutorial interest or duty. For purposes of indictment itself, it is sufficient, for example, to allege that the defendant conspired with "another person or persons known." The identity of the person can be supplied, upon request, in a bill of particulars. See USAM 9-27.760. With respect to the trial, the person's identity and status as a co-conspirator can be established, for evidentiary purposes, through the introduction of proof sufficient to invoke the co-conspirator hearsay exception without subjecting the person to the burden of a formal accusation by a grand jury. In the absence of some significant justification, federal prosecutors generally should not identify unindicted co-conspirators in conspiracy indictments." A prosecutor can't just throw a list out there; the presiding judge must conclude that the individual's statements or acts were in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy. Moreover, the Attorney's Manual discourages the actual naming of any party not actually charged in an indictment, noting, "Courts have applied this reasoning to preclude the public identification of unindicted third-party wrongdoers in plea hearings, sentencing memoranda, and other government pleadings." Legal policy experts, including the American Bar Association, have recommended outlawing the designation entirely or at least banning the release of any names.
In light of the seriousness of the designation, it is an inherent conflict of interest for any DOJ component to have a business relationship with an unindicted co-conspirator in a federal criminal case, until the trial or a plea bargain produces some resolution which is favorable to the designee. It's especially preposterous for the FBI to have entered into a training agreement with CAIR while its agents were providing the information to the U.S. Attorney which resulted in its designation as an unindicted co-conspirator in the HLF case. The White House and the Attorney General can suspend that agreement anytime, without cost to the taxpayer, until the case is retried and completed. Now that a federal judge in Dallas has denied HLF's motion to delay the case beyond the planned September 8 starting date, we will soon have a disposition of the list of unindicted co-conspirators. And if the trial doesn't clear them, there won't be any excuses for the continued FBI-CAIR relationship.
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Today, Andy McCarthy at National Review Online penned an excellent piece related to an 8-6-08 NY Times editorial concerning the verdicts in the Hamdan military commission trial at Gitmo. The results of this trial demonstrate that American military officers truly are the independent minded, moral self-thinkers we expect them to be. Sure, members of the military must "take and follow orders." But they must also be able to think for themselves and act in a moral way. This is especially true for the Officer Corps...the leadership of the US military. We expect military officers to act with honor and sound judgement. Contrary to what some on the far left (very many of whom never served in the military) may believe, when one becomes a US military officer, one does not morph into a mindless automaton.
The officers who served on this jury had a duty to independently weigh the evidence presented to them within the rules of the Commission and to render a decision based on their own judgement of that evidence...not based on any external orders. The conduct of the proceedings and the verdict demonstrate those officers did just that. They not only vindicated the Commission...the "system"...but they brought great credit upon themselves and the Officer Corps. They upheld that code of honor We the People expect of them.
The NY Times, in its derogatory editorial, not only ignores that fact but does a backhanded insult to those officers who served on the jury.
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Militant Muslim cleric Abu Bakar Ba'asyir announced on 6 August that he was resigning from the Indonesian Mujahidin Assembly (Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia, or MMI) due to an internal dispute. The MMI, with Ba'asyir as its emir, or leader, has been campaigning to turn Indonesia into an Islamic state. Its hard-line views have led many in the media to call it the overt face of Jemaah Islamiyah.
Ba'syir has left MMI because he disagreed with the leadership system the assembly has adopted. Under the current system, its top members are chosen by vote. Ba'asyir condemned such a democratic method as "un-Islamic," and instead said that the emir should be the only authorized decision-maker.
He is being temporarily replaced by his former deputy, cleric M. Tholib, until the MMI convenes its next congress to elect a new emir.
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 The NEFA Foundation has obtained and translated a copy of the statement from Al-Qaida leader Mustafa Abu al-Yazid acknowledging the "martyrdom" of most wanted Egyptian Al-Qaida commander "Abu Khabab al-Masri" (a.k.a. Midhat Mursi al-Sayyid Umar) in a U.S. airstrike targeting a lawless region of northwestern Pakistan. According to the communiqué, the airstrike also killed Abu Mohammed Ibrahim Bin Abu al-Faraj al-Masri, the son of the former Chief Shariah Judge of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad Movement. The document further threatened, "Although Abu Khabab has departed from us, he has left behind him-by the mercy and grace of Allah-a generation of honorable young men who will cause you torment and avenge him and his brothers, with the support of Allah. Although an expert has left us, he has left in his wake-thanks to Allah-new experts who have trained under him and learned from him over the years to volunteer, to sacrifice, and to be patient and tolerant on the path of righteousness."
The translated communique can be downloaded from the NEFA Foundation website.
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ZOG’s Nightmare
White nationalist and supremacist groups have been long known for their innovative inculcation tactics; such as their “White Power” music and their computer games that depict humiliation and death of minorities. One particularly aggressive example is the computer game “ZOG’s Nightmare,” a first-person shooter game in which the player must kill a certain number of Jews, homosexuals, African-Americans, and Hispanics in order to reach the next level of the game.
“ZOG” is an acronym for “Zionist Occupied Government;”white nationalist code to communicate their belief that Jews secretly control the government. "ZOG's Nightmare" suggests that Jews and other minorities will lose their power to whites after a bloody revolution. “ZOG’s Nightmare” is very similar in format and theme to other white supremacist computer games, such as “White Law” and “Ethnic Cleansing,” both of which depict the stabbing or shooting of minorities from a first-person perspective. What makes “ZOG’s Nightmare” stand out from the other games is the unvarnished language used by the game creator on the promotional video clips found on the main web site. Most white supremacists do not intend to conceal their hatred of minorities, but most do not express their desired method of how minority groups will be segregated from whites with the degree of blatancy expressed in “ZOG’s Nightmare." Most white nationalist and supremacist groups will only subtly infer violence because they are trying to develop a broader, more mainstream audience. Their violent aspirations are usually only clearly expressed through their computer games or through the lyrics of the “White Power” songs.
The “ZOG’s Nightmare” web site opens with an announcement that it is a “Whites-only Web site. No niggers, spics, faggots, Jews, or other mutts allowed”—the type of people, the game's creator says, “who follow Obama.” After entering the site, the visitor can find video clips of the entire game being played by its creator and full voice-over narration of the action taking place on the screen. As the player is stabbing an African-American police officer in the face, for example, the narrator says, “Die nigger pig.” After killing all the minority police officers, the player reaches the next level of the game in which minorities, who have invaded a Nazi office building, are shot. The player enters several storage rooms, one of which contains barrels of Zyklon B, which the narrator says is for “your favorite Jewie [sic].” Another room contains boxes of “nigger skin lampshades.” Another tier of the game features “The Good Jew Room,” in which, the viewer is told, Jews are used for medical research. “We have our ovens, electroshock devices, and we have our Jewish corpses.”
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Recently, two people on whom I did extensive reporting because of their ties to al Qaeda in West Africa have again surfaced in the news, a useful reminder that sub-Saharan Africa was and is a target of opportunity for radical Islamist movements.
In Kenya, there is an an intense manhunt underway for Fazul Adallah, one of the masterminds of 1998 East Africa embassy bombings.
Fazul was also active in Liberia and Sierra Leone immediately after the embassy bombings. While several of his suspected cohorts have been rounded up, he has again, it seems, managed to escape.
This indicates that senior al Qaeda operatives continue to operate in East Africa, where they have carried out successful attacks in the past. There are increasing reports of efforts by _wahhabi_ groups to radicalize East African Muslim, who have traditionally been tolerant of other beliefs.
The second is Aafia Siddiqui, who may have been involved in the West African diamond trade as well. She is expected in a New York court today on charges of attempted murder.
As my colleague Andrew Cochran has noted, Siddiqui is said by the Special Court for Sierra Leone to have been in Liberia receiving al Qaeda diamonds.
My own research showed that a woman had arrived to collect diamonds from al Qaeda operatives in Monrovia, and had returned, with two men, to Karachi, Pakistan, and then moved on to Quetta, where police and intelligence lost her trace. It was not clear to me at the time of the reporting that the woman was Siddiqui. Perhaps the New York trial will help clarify the issue. My full blog is here.
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As the situation in Afghanistan worsens, many military officials have come to see the growing safe haven for insurgent groups in Pakistan as the key to the Afghanistan war. Today Bill Roggio and I have an article at the Daily Standard examining how Pakistan's deterioration harms coalition efforts in Afghanistan: The primary advantage that terrorist sanctuaries in northwestern
Pakistan provide to the Afghan insurgency is the ability to operate
with relative freedom in that country. The U.S. military is constrained
in cross-border strikes and hot pursuit because Pakistan views the
tribal areas as sovereign territory. Not only is Pakistan a U.S. ally,
but there are also serious concerns that too heavy a U.S. hand in the
tribal areas will destabilize the government and push more members of
Pakistan's military and intelligence communities and civilian
population into the extremists' camp.
Thus, the American military is handcuffed in its ability to respond
to attacks when the enemy melts back over Pakistan's border. Reluctance
to strike in Pakistani territory also prevents the U.S. military from
disrupting the enemy's bases and supply lines. The safe havens in
northwestern Pakistan give the Taliban and allied groups a virtually
untouchable rear area, where they can recruit, arm, train, and
infiltrate fighters into Afghanistan....
The second advantage that Afghan insurgents derive from Pakistan is
the ability to train and gain combat experience. American military and
intelligence officials have told us that more than 100 training camps
are operating in the North-West Frontier Province and tribal areas, up
from an estimated 29 camps last year in Waziristan. The camps vary in
size and specialty, and some are temporary.
At these camps, a host of extremist groups--including local Taliban
organizations, hardcore al Qaeda recruits, and Pakistani terror groups
focused on Kashmir--are trained in a variety of tactics, techniques, and
procedures. Training for the Taliban's military arm focuses on the
fight against the Pakistani army or NATO forces in Afghanistan. Other
camps focus on training suicide bombers or preparing al Qaeda
operatives for attacks in the West. One camp exclusively services the
Black Guard, Osama bin Laden's elite bodyguard.
The complete article can be found here.
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I have a long article in the latest issue of the Hudson Institute's Current Trends in Islamist Ideology entitled Islam, Islamism and Jihadism in Italy. Readers of the CT Blog might be particularly interested in the last part, given the paucity of English-language sources on the matter. Based mostly on primary sources and years of field work, the section describes at length the history and development of jihadist networks operating in Italy, devoting extensive attention to the infamous Islamic Cultural Institute of Milan.
You can read the article here.
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Aafia Siddiqui, long sought for alleged ties to Al Qaeda, appears in federal court today in New York City. Siddiqui was arrested on July 17 by the Afghanistan National Police and was carrying documents describing the creation of explosives, descriptions of landmarks in the United States, and substances that were sealed in bottles and glass jars." While she was in custody, she seized a rifle and fired twice at U.S. military personnel who were preparing to question her. A federal agent returned fire, and she was wounded while shouting in English that she wanted to kill Americans. Siddiqui is charged with one count of attempting to kill United States officers and employees and one count of assaulting United States officers and employees. The NEFA Foundation has posted the complaint, the DOJ press release about the complaint, and other documents referring to her.
Siddiqui has been on the Ten Most Wanted list of the Boston office of the FBI for years for her alleged role as a terrorist facilitator. In 2004, the Attorney General and FBI Director identified her as one of seven people wanted for questioning about suspected ties to Al Qaeda. She is alleged to have assisted Majid Khan and Ammar al-Baluchi, two alleged top Al Qaeda lieutenants now imprisoned at Gitmo, in their activities in the U.S. She is also alleged to have been among among the "intended beneficiaries" of the misuse of funds by Care International, the Boston-based Muslim charity whose leaders were convicted on several charges (later partially dismissed by a federal judge). Siddiqui is also implicated in Al Qaeda's interest in the west African diamond trade and traveled to Liberia in 2001. See this post by Douglas Farah in August 2005, quoting Mike Shanlin, the former CIA station chief for Liberia. "'They (al Qaeda operatives) were there during the period in question,' referring to the period of 1998-2001. 'And clearly they were involved in some sort of a diamond business. That's a fact.'"
Siddiqui's capture is an important break for U.S. counter-terrorism efforts and could lead to significant information about the Al Qaeda leadership structure worldwide.
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General Barry R McCaffrey USA (Ret) recently traveled to NATO headquarters in Brussels and to Afghanistan and filed a trip report with his impressions. In a section titled "The Bottom Line," he reported the following:
Afghanistan is in misery. 68% of the population has never known peace. Life expectancy is 44 years. It has the second highest maternal mortality rate in the world: One of six pregnant Afghan women dies for each live birth. Terrorist incidents and main force insurgent violence is rising (34% increase this year in kinetic events.) Battle action and casualties are now much higher in Afghanistan for US forces than they are in Iraq. The Afghan government at provincial and district level is largely dysfunctional and corrupt. The security situation (2.8 million refugees); the economy (unemployment 40% and rising, extreme poverty 41%, acute food shortages, inflation 12% and rising, agriculture broken); the giant heroin/opium criminal enterprise ($4 billion and 800 metric tons of heroin); and Afghan governance are all likely to get worse in the coming 24 months.
The magnificent, resilient Afghan people absolutely reject the ideology and violence of the Taliban (90% or greater) but have little faith in the ability of the government to provide security, justice, clean water, electricity, or jobs. Much of Afghanistan has great faith in US military forces, but enormous suspicion of the commitment and staying power of our NATO allies.
The courageous and determined NATO Forces (the employable forces are principally US, Canadian, British, Polish, and Dutch) and the Afghan National Army (the ANA is a splendid success story) cannot be defeated in battle. They will continue to slaughter the Pashtun insurgents, criminals, and international terrorist syndicates who directly confront them. (7000+ killed during 2007 alone.) The Taliban will increasingly turn to terrorism directed against the people and the Afghan National Police. However, the atmosphere of terror cannot becountered by relying mainly on military means. We cannot win through a war of attrition. The economic and political support provided by the international community is currently inadequate to deal with the situation.
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In the capital of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan today, the widely
read newspaper The Nation contained an article entitled "A wake-up
call," by Tarik Jan, which should be required reading for American
government policy makers to get an insight into the thinking of many
Pakistanis today. While the continuing revelations about Pakistan
government members' support for Jihad should be a sufficient
wake-up call to American policy makers, the August 4 article in The
Nation further demonstrates the pro-Sharia, pro-Taliban position held
by many Pakistanis.
In the August 4 article "A wake-up call," Tarik Jan clearly calls for
Pakistan government support of the Taliban and calls for Sharia law as
a basis for governing the Islamic Republic of Pakistan:
"The pro-shariah local Taliban are sons of the soil. They
are not separatists and are the upholders of the integrity of Pakistan.
They may be ultra conservatives but when they call for the shariah
implementation, they are in line with the nation's constitution, which
visualises an Islamic Pakistan. Some people like Rehman Malik and
others who share the former's perception are raising hell that they
would not let the shariah call prevail, for in their perception it will
be against the government writ. A state, as they frantically argue,
cannot afford to have two kinds of law and administration."
"Right now in FATA, the federation has lost friends. Those who side
with the federation are killed by dubious elements. Thus, it will be
good politics if pro-state Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan is embraced by the
Gilani administration for seven obvious reasons:"
"One, it will be a step towards restoring the government writ. Two, it
will bring much-needed peace. Three, it will bring order to a chaotic
situation where the colonial set-up has already collapsed for its
sadistic approach to people and their problems, inefficiency and
insensitivity. Four, once the local Taliban are recognised as the
rightful representatives of their people in their region of influence,
they will be able to chase out miscreants from their jurisdiction.
Five, they can also go after the blood of the agents' provocateurs, and
Indian recruits engaged in sabotage and fomenting scare in society.
Six, the Taliban can also negotiate neutralisation of the presence of
foreign elements if due inquiry proves their presence. Seven, it will
strengthen Pakistan as a nation and a state."
"From all counts, the FATA situation is manageable; it offers challenge
as well as hope. Islam can heal wounds, give courage, and help build a
nation that yearns for Islam's remedial power. The call for the shariah
is not a laughable joke. If the PPP administration, and the
establishment that supports it, did not read the situation correctly,
it may devastate our nation. Today, it is the call for the shariah in
FATA, tomorrow its sympathy wave can embrace the whole nation. The
colonial world and its manifestations in Pakistan are in the death
throes. The nation cannot continue with its stink for long. The FATA
call is a wake-up call."
Tarik Jan's commentary in The Nation should indeed be a wake-up call for American leaders regarding the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. Public opinion polls suggest that many other Pakistanis share Tarik Jan's views. In consistent national polls in August 2007 (page 34, Question 16e) and January 2008 (page 31, Question 12g), nearly 75% of the Pakistan population stated that it was important for the government to implement "strict Sharia law." This Islamic republic has federal Sharia courts today, and the Taliban are working to develop more Sharia courts in FATA and NWFP regions of Pakistan. Such support for a Sharia-based Islamic Republic of Pakistan is hardly just "extremist" thinking. America's leaders need to reassess Pakistan, as they also need to develop a strategic assessment of the challenges of Islamic supremacism itself. The Nation states that it is the "market leader" in Pakistan's capital (Islamabad) as well as throughout Punjab province, with a "strong presence" in Karachi. The Nation is described by BBC as one of the major media institutions in Pakistan, and it is part of the 60 year old Nawa-i-Waqt group of publications. It claims to be "internationally the most quoted Pakistani newspaper." The Nation clearly had no qualms about a commentary that openly promotes the Taliban. The author, Tarik Jan, is a senior research fellow of the Institute of Policy Studies (IPS), who has been quoted in Time Magazine and the Christian Science Monitor to provide insight on Pakistan and Islam. If American leaders continue to ignore such pro-Sharia, pro-Taliban sentiment in Pakistan, they do so at the peril of our national security and the continuing threat to our armed forces fighting the Taliban in Afghanistan.
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The Justice Department today announced the first set of indictments over the kidnappings in February 2003 of the three Americans rescued by the Colombian Army on July 2. Hely Mejia Mendoza, known as “Martin Sombra,” was indicted in Washington, D.C. (Acrobat file) on seven counts of terrorism and weapons charges. Sombra was captured in February 2008, was one of the original founders of FARC, and is the most senior FARC member ever captured alive. Marc Gonsalves, Keith Stansell and Thomas Howes were captured with two other Americans on February 13, 2003. FARC terrorists killed the other American captured that day, Thomas Janis, immediately; Martin Sombra served as “jailer” of the three American hostages for most of their first two years of captivity. From a DOJ press release: "He designed and supervised the construction of a large barbed-wire concentration camp in which he held the Americans and dozens of other hostages in the jungle. The Indictment charges that Sombra used chains and wires to bind the necks and wrists of the American hostages to prevent their escape, and forced the hostages on a grueling 40 day “death march” with heavy backpacks through dense jungle to outrun Colombian military forces. Sombra ordered his confederates to kill the Americans and the other hostages rather than allow them to be rescued by the Colombian police or military."
The Justice Department also unsealed an indictment in December 2003 (Acrobat file) of six other FARC senior commanders involved in the kidnapping and holding of the Americans. Two of the six are dead, including FARC Raul Reyes (see our archive of posts on him), and the FARC’s former “Supreme Leader,” Manuel Marulanda Velez, while the other four remain at large. The Rewards for Justice Program of the State Department is offering a $5 million dollar award for information leading to the apprehension or conviction of any FARC commanders involved in the hostage taking of Keith Stansell, Thomas Howes, and Marc Gonsalves, and the murder of American Thomas Janis.
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While the crisis over the Iranian nuclear program is taking a nefarious turn, implications for the West and the Middle East are being assessed. But not much is said about Al Qaeda.
In fact, how is Al Qaeda going to take advantage of this situation?
I wrote a piece for the Middle East Times on that topic.
You can read the whole article here.
Israeli transport minister and potential future Prime Minister Shaul Mofaz, addressing a Washington crowd on Friday, left no doubt about Israel's intentions regarding Iran's nuclear program: Israel won't let it go through. Since negotiations with Iran have gone nowhere in the past six years, military confrontation looks almost inevitable. While the international community fears the implications of such an outcome, one player can't wait for the first shots to be fired: al-Qaida.
Al-Qaida has been expecting and awaiting a U.S.-Iran war over the nuclear issue. It is in fact one of the major tenets of al-Qaida's master plan. According to the late Abu Mussab al-Zarqawi, the very likely collision between the United States and Iran over the nuclear issue is going to help al-Qaida advance its plan. Indeed since Iran is going to be less focused on exerting its control on Syria and Lebanon, al-Qaida will easier penetrate these two countries.
Jordanian journalist Fouad Hussein in his 2005 book, "Al-Zarqawi: Al-Qaida's Second Generation" delved extensively into that issue. Thanks to his personal connection to Zarqawi - many years ago, they spent time together in prison - Hussein was able to interview him along with other major al-Qaida leaders, including Seif al-Adl, the Egyptian terrorist allegedly behind the attacks against the two U.S. embassies in West Africa in 1998.
Unsurprisingly, Hussein explains that al-Qaida's final goal is to establish an Islamic Caliphate in 20 years through seven phases. The first phase called, "The Awakening" really started on Sept. 11, 2001 when al-Qaida attacked New York and Washington D.C. These attacks supposedly awakened the Muslim nation (the "ummah") that had been in hibernation. This phase ended in 2003 when coalition troops entered Iraq.
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The NEFA Foundation has released the latest edition of its TerrorWatch video broadcast, this week examining Al-Qaida's attempts at an organizational resurgence in Sunni regions of Iraq - particularly in the northern city of Mosul. On June 23, 2008, Al-Qaidas "Islamic State of Iraq" (ISI) released a new propaganda video denying that the declaration of an "Islamic State" had been a premature measure and insisting, "we are determined not to repeat [the] tragedy" of the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords "for the believer is not to be stung twice from the same source." The video also included sections of the "martyrdom will" of a Kuwaiti-born suicide bomber who admonished fellow Al-Qaida supporters, "We have been sitting on the Internet, and we have been watching the videos of the operations, while saying 'Allahu Akhbar.' But what good does this accomplish? We sit and do nothing, while our brothers from the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) feel the bitter taste of torment at the hands of the apostates and infidels."
Click to view TerrorWatch Episode 7 on the NEFA Foundation website.
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The Times of London today brings an interesting reminder of the law of unintended consequences, and the rise of radical Islam, through the first Bosnian conflict.
I and others have long argued the the Bosnian conflict provided the template for al Qaeda action in the years ahead. Fresh off driving the Soviet Union from Afghanistan and convinced Allah would deliver another major victory, thousands of _mujahadeen_rushed from Afghanistan and elsewhere to fight for Bosnian Muslims.
The recruitment, training, rapid radicalization and the the massive use of charities (the Third World Relief Agency-TWRA-in particular) came from the Afghan playbook and were honed in Bosnia.
How did this come to pass, that al Qaeda suddenly found an opening to recruit and fight in the West? The movement had its root in the campaign of Rodovan Karadzic and his allies, of ethnic cleansing of Muslims in the former Yugoslavia.
In the eyes of Serb propagandists, the Muslim population of Bosnia was doubly contemptible, both for their religion and because they were historically seen as renegade Serbs. Karadzic's deputy and then successor, Biljana Plavsic, has explained: “It was genetically deformed material [among the Serbs] that embraced Islam. And now, of course,” she lamented, “with each successive generation, this gene simply becomes concentrated. It gets worse and worse...” But a well-crafted final solution was at hand, and 100,000 Muslims paid the price of such “deformity” with their lives.
The Muslims in Bosnia, traditionally unaffiliated with the _wahhabist_ and _jihadist_ theology of radical Islamism, turned to the Muslim world for aid, finding benefactors in Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Iran and elsewhere. THe unifying force that held these disparate donor groups together was the Muslim Brotherhood, operating through TWRA and linked to Sudan's primary MB leader, Hassan al Turabi. (For more on this, see my previous work here. My full blog is here.
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Would America find it a shocking news revelation if a white supremacist organization had members supporting Ku Klux Klan terrorism? Would the FBI go to white supremacist political groups to fight the Ku Klux Klan, or seek white supremacist leaders to convince KKK members to change their thinking? But when it comes to the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, the Taliban, and Jihadist organizations around the world, this type of nonsensical thinking has become a common argument among many international relations circles, including American government leadership, because nearly 8 years after 9/11, such leadership continues to refuse to clearly define the enemy threat and ideology.
The American media and government seem to think it is major news that members of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan's intelligence organization (ISI) have reportedly been supporting the Taliban and Jihadist activities. They are surprised that a nation, where polls consistently show that 75 percent support the implementation of "strict Sharia law," would have individuals that support a group such as the Taliban whose goal is to enforce Sharia law and work towards restoring a caliphate. They are surprised that a nation whose government officials call for making "blasphemy" an international crime punished by death would have individuals that support attacks in other countries. Where do they think members of the Pakistan Taliban come from? What ideology do they think inspires the Taliban?
Responding to new that CIA sources and other reports claimed links between the Islamic Republic of Pakistan's ISI and the Taliban, Pakistan's Prime Minister Gilani stated that he was "pretty sure" that the ISI contained no pockets of Taliban sympathy. When further reports by the International Herald Tribune and the Wall Street Journal alleged links between the Islamic Republic of Pakistan's ISI to the bombing of the Indian embassy in Afghanistan, an Islamic Republic of Pakistan government spokeswoman Sherry Rehman stated: "There are probably still individuals within the ISI who are ideologically sympathetic to the Taleban and act on their own in ways that are not in convergence with the policies and interests of the government of Pakistan."
What policies and interests are they not acting in convergence with? Enforcement of Sharia?
This week, while President Bush has been praising the Islamic Republic of Pakistan as "a strong ally and a vibrant democracy," the Islamic Republic of Pakistan's federal government has been meeting with the Pakistan Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) government on plans to implement Sharia law throughout the Malakand Division and Swat regions, as part of the so-called "peace" agreements with the Taliban in that area. The move to expand Sharia law throughout parts of the NWFP and Pakistan tribal areas has been in progress for months. But our president continues to claim that the Islamic Republic of Pakistan is our "strong ally." Is it going to build a "vibrant democracy" based on Sharia?
The delusions about the Islamic Republic of Pakistan serve as a microcosm for the delusions about global Jihad and the unwillingness to recognize its basis in Islamic supremacism. As 9/11 served as the tactical wake up call for Americans on Jihadist's tactical threats, Pakistan serves as a strategic wake up call on Jihad's ideological basis in Islamic supremacism and the dangers of our continuing denial about it. But are the American media and government listening? Not really. They are shocked, they want to stop funding to Pakistan, etc., but they won't actually mention the word "Sharia" or the phrase "Islamic supremacism" in any reports, let alone the term "Islamist."
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On May 8, I was honored to chair one of four panels at a special seminar, "Dealing with Today's Asymmetric Threat," co-sponsored by the National Defense University and CACI International, with assistance from the Counterterrorism Foundation. The purpose of the seminar was to establish a framework for the development of an integrated and synchronized strategy, by the end of the calendar year, to address the asymmetrical threats to United States and global security. My panel, titled, "Global Strategy to Counter Terrorism and Extremism," included Contributing Expert Douglas Farah; VADM Bert Calland, USN (Ret.), former CIA Deputy Director; Jose Rodriguez, former Director of the CIA's National Clandestine Center and the Counterterrorism Center; and Lt. Col. Bill Cowan, USMC (Ret.), FOX News Channel analyst and President of WVC3. My comments included recommendations for the need for continued deployment of joint DOD-Treasury "Threat Finance Cells" and the need to promote the continued work of the non-governmental CT community of nonprofits, journalists, and independent media, including this site. I participated with senior officials at NDU and CACI in planning the seminar and look forward to working with them and the broader community towards the development of the strategy for the next Administration and Congress. Contributing Expert Walid Phares participated in another panel on "Strategic Communications," which explored how to protect security through an effective communication strategy.
CACI International posted the first study resulting from that seminar, "The Need for an Integrated National Asymmetric Threat Strategy," on its website. This outstanding study will join other studies recently released as benchmarks for policymakers in the next Administration and Congress as they develop new policies to deal with various threats worldwide. The study advises developing new strategies for our strategic communications, defense and homeland security, economic assets, and diplomatic power. Some excerpts: During the Cold War, Western leaders developed a shared consensus on a strategy of deterrence and containment. From that consensus came strength. Today, U.S. security objectives are challenged by multiple states that have strengthened their economies, enhanced their militaries, and gained increased credibility. Rather than dominating, we now compete globally with multiple powers. While America debates the merits of international engagement and nation-building, others have dedicated themselves to securing global influence and key resources across the globe - a strategy that has been described as economic colonialism.” Countries we view as rogue states now enjoy diplomatic, economic, and strategic lifelines from these competing powers.
Nuclear weapons development by Iran and North Korea threatens a new round of destabilizing proliferation. Instability in Pakistan and other potential nuclear states could result in the loss of control of fissile material and technology, providing rising powers and non-state actors increasing parity and the ability to assert local and regional hegemony. The world also faces a pervasive, non-state, non-government set of adversaries, including radicals such as Al Qaida, Hamas, Hezbollah, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). Organized crime groups, such as the Lebanese and Hong Kong Mafias, and crime syndicates from Central America and Mexico, to Nigeria to Russia and Taiwan, also threaten our security. Across the globe, these and other non-state actors have been effective in their asymmetric developments, processes, and actions.
Besides these four key elements, our national approach to dealing with asymmetric threats should include strategies for health, education, emergency response, resource sharing, and nation-building to counter and correct the trend of failing states. The cultures, religions, and ideals in the nations we hope to assist may differ, but the end goal is the same - stable nation-states with the political, economic, social, and security institutions able to provide their people with security, food, clean water, education, prosperity, and hope for the future.
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The retiring director of the New York and northern New Jersey division of the U.S. Treasury Department's High Intensity Financial Crime Area (HIFCA), Gary Murray, gave an interview to Fortent's MoneyLaundering.Com with some insights into recent trends in his work to fight money maundering and terrorist financing. The HIFCA program concentrates law enforcement efforts in designated high-intensity money laundering zones. Murray also seconded a proposal by Contributing Expert Dennis Lormel and by Jeffrey Breinholt, a valuable Contributing Expert here while he was on temporary leave from the Justice Department. Some excerpts: In terms of criminal activity, 50% of my work is involved with some kind type of economic crime. In New York, you see a lot of tax evasion, Black Market Peso Exchange activity and the money often moves around the world before to New York. Structuring is still prevalent but criminals are continuing to exploit as many avenues available to them as possible. I do think we are seeing less cash leaving airports but more bulk cash smuggling throughout the borders - a lot of moving from the southern part of the former Soviet Union and that money appears to be washing through our shore for tax purposes...
I can tell you that the SARs (Suspicious Activity Reports) we receive today are ten times better than five years ago. When financial institutions are new to SAR writing, they have a learning curve to go through. But I think recently issued guidelines from FinCEN have helped.
Q.: People like former FBI special agent Dennis Lormel and Department of Justice agent Jeff Breinholt have called for greater openness from law enforcement, such as providing select compliance officers with access to otherwise classified data on investigations. What do you think about the idea?
I think there should open communication between law enforcement and the financial community. There should be a security clearance for certain institutions. See Doug Farah's June 27 post on the criminal-terrorist nexus and Dennis Lormel's June 16 post on the impact on the enforcement of money laundering laws from a recent Supreme Court decision.
Today, the Treasury Department's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), which administers the Bank Secrecy Act (as amended by the USA Patriot Act), issued new guidance, "Recognizing Suspicious Activity - Red Flags for Casinos and Card Clubs," with indications "that may indicate the presence of money laundering, terrorist financing, and related financial crimes." They are a laundry list of ways in which suspects attempt to evade BSA reporting requirements, engage in unusual gambling activites or financial transactions in and around casinos, with examples as specific as: A pair of bettors frequently cover between them both sides of an even bet, such as:
- Betting both "red and black" or "odd and even" on roulette;
- Betting both with and against the bank in baccarat/mini-baccarat; or
- Betting the "pass line" or "come line" and the "don't pass line" or "don't come line" in craps; and,
the aggregate amount of both bettors' total wagering is in excess of $5,000.
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This morning, The New York Times has a front page story stating that U.S. intelligence has determined that Pakistan’s intelligence agency, Inter-Services Intelligence, aided the July 7, 2008 attack on the Indian Embassy in Kabul. The conclusion was “based on intercepted communications between Pakistani intelligence officers and militants who carried out the attack…”
This is a very big deal. Indian intelligence sees the ISI behind every adverse event (it should be noted that sometimes, this assessment is correct), but oftentimes the follow-up investigation is lax and inconclusive. India’s security services are of uneven quality (with, it should be emphasized, some able people in top slots) and blaming the ISI is easier than engaging in the needed long-term reform. More recently Afghanistan’s President Karzai has been publicly accusing Pakistan of supporting the Taliban against his regime.
But for U.S. intelligence, particularly the CIA (which has a long working relationship with the ISI) to come to this conclusion - and allow it to appear in the newspaper of record is an event of a different magnitude altogether and it should be taken very seriously.
Read the full post here.
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It didn't take long for that old Yogi Berra feeling to hit. Immediately after questions about Pakistan's ISI's definition of who the enemy actually is, we get a report that says the ISI is actively aiding the Taliban in bombing activities.
The conclusion (that the ISI helped plan the July 7 bombing of the Indian embassy in Kabul) was based on intercepted communications between Pakistani intelligence officers and militants who carried out the attack, the officials said, providing the clearest evidence to date that Pakistani intelligence officers are actively undermining American efforts to combat militants in the region.
The American officials also said there was new information showing that members of the Pakistani intelligence service were increasingly providing militants with details about the American campaign against them, in some cases allowing militants to avoid American missile strikes in Pakistan's tribal areas.
So, not only are members of the ISI, the recipient of billions of dollars in US aid since 9/11, not interested in helping hunt for Bin Laden, but they are using US taxpayer dollars to help plan attacks by our enemies against our friends.
(For a comprehensive look at the Taliban's new emergence, see this NEFA Foundation report.)
What is wrong with that picture? My full blog is here.
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